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LATENT JUSTICE: DAUBERP'S IMPACT ON




The world contains many "unique" occurrences. For example, it is
commonly believed that no two snowflakes,' zebra stripes,2 diamonds,'
or fingerprints, are identical. However, scientists may never be able
to determine empirically whether or not such assumptions about
uniqueness are true.'
Because it is impossible to compare every snowflake, zebra stripe,
diamond, or fingerprint ever created, scientists must instead rely on
mathematical presumptions. Thus, they can speculate that
approximately 3 x 10" (or 30,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000)
snowflakes have fallen in the last 130 million years.5 Scientists can
also determine that the number of possible molecular compositions of
a snowflake far exceeds the number of snowflakes ever created.'
Based on these statistics, as well as empirical data that show no two
snowflakes in a given group have ever matched, scientists extrapolate
the probabilities of two identical snowflakes ever existing The
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Deborah W. Denno for directing me to this topic and for her guidance.
Special thanks to my parents for their love and support, and to Timothy Carey for his
understanding and encouragement.
1. Keith Inman & Norah Rudin, An Introduction to Forensic DNA Analysis 4
(1997).
2. Baltimore Zoo, at http.//vwv.baltimorezoo.org/kidzonelaotm-zebra.cfm (last
visited Mar. 12, 2002); The Ultimate Field Guide, Online Guide, at
http://www.ultimatefieldguide.com/burchells._zebra.htm (last visited Mar. 12,2002).
3. For an example of jewelry stores that tout diamonds as unique, see Seng
Jewelers, at http'//www.sengjewelers.com/onlcustresourceldiamonds.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2002); E.M. Smith Jewelers, at http'J/www.emsmith-
jewelers.com/gemstone/diamond-abt.htm (last visited Mar. 12,2002).
4. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., "there are no certainties in science." 509 U.S. 579,590 (1993).
5. Inman & Rudin, supra note 1, at 4 (estimating the number of snowflakes that
have fallen since the Jurassic period).
6. Id. (describing the number of molecular water molecules in a typical
snowflake as having (1,000,000,000,000,000)1,''  possible arrangements, a
number seemingly impossible to comprehend).
7. Some scientists refer to this method as the "multiplication rule of probability."
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magnitude of these probabilities has led scientists to conclude that the
likelihood of finding two identical snowflakes is infinitesimal.8
However, despite the near certainty that data about the uniqueness
of snowflakes may engender, "there are no certainties in science."9
Like the comparison of snowflakes, the comparison of fingerprints, a
science called "dactylography," yields scientific probabilities without
absolute conclusions. The infinite number of different spatial
configurations and variable appearances of fingerprints mean the
chance of finding two identical fingerprints is similar to that of finding
two identical snowflakes.10 This uniqueness is a fundamental tenet of
fingerprint identification.
Yet, unlike snowflakes, fingerprints can be used to convict
criminals; "liberty and sometimes life" are at stake." Because
fingerprint comparison techniques may be used for this end, they
merit special attention. While two fingerprints being compared to one
another may look similar, they may in fact be different. Numerous
individuals have been convicted because fingerprint examiners made
incorrect identifications using fingerprints. 2
Although scientists cannot know if every fingerprint that ever
existed is unique, fingerprint examiners move closer to scientific
certainties when they rely on well thought-out hypotheses and precise
methodologies. The careful work of the individuals who employ these
methodologies is critical to the accuracy of the conclusion reached, for
human error can result in the improper conviction of criminal
defendants. Thus, the study and comparison of fingerprints pose
significant challenges and risks that this Note will examine in detail. 13
Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons From the Law's Formative Encounters
With Forensic Identification Science, 49 Hastings L.J. 1069, 1086 (1998). This rule
posits that if an object varies in the number of independent factors that contribute to
its makeup, as snowflakes vary in their molecular composition, the probability of
finding any one combination of these factors is found by multiplying together the
probability of finding each independent factor. Id.
8. Inman & Rudin, supra note 1, at 4 ("[lit is unreasonable to believe that any
one [snowflake] has occurred more than once." (emphasis added)).
9. See supra note 4, and accompanying text.
10. See Inman & Rudin, supra note 1, at 5.
11. United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000), affd, 260
F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
12. See Steve Berry, Pointing a Finger at Prints, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 2002, at Al,
2002 WL 2457000 (explaining that, over the past twenty-five years, fingerprint
examiners have incorrectly matched the fingerprints of criminal defendants with
fingerprints found at crime scenes several times).
13. When fingerprint examiners operate with the assumption that fingerprints are
unique, they can blind themselves to the alternative possibility that two identical
prints may exist. Saks, supra note 7, at 1086 n.76. The overall scientific reliability of
dactylography may be weakened as a result, because the science will never be
thoroughly tested. Id.; cf. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 505 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 7,2002), vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002)
("'[E]ven when there are an impressive number of consistent outcomes and no
inconsistent outcomes, the hypothesis is not definitively confirmed because it is
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The standards for admission of expert testimony regarding
fingerprint identification in the courtroom have changed over the last
one hundred years. Fingerprints have long been considered
"scientific" evidence. This perception of fingerprints has been
questioned in light of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the
admissibility of expert scientific testimony. One recent federal
judicial decision, United States v. Llera Plaza,4 limited the extent to
which testimony by fingerprint examiners could be used to identify a
defendant. This and other recent federal judicial decisions have
challenged forensic science in general, and fingerprint examiners in
particular, to justify the reliability of their methodologies as never
before.'5
For over seventy years, federal courts required scientific techniques
to be generally accepted among the relevant scientific community
before they could be admitted at trial. This "general acceptance"
standard, enunciated in Frye v. United States,t6 a 1923 federal criminal
case, dominated the debate over how expert scientific witnesses could
testify in the courtroom, 7 even after the introduction of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 in 1975.18 Rule 702, entitled "Testimony by Experts,"
stated that a qualified expert could testify to any specialized
knowledge, including scientific knowledge, that would help the jury
better understand the evidence or "determine a fact in issue."'"
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2I a civil case, held that Rule 702 superseded the
Frye standard.21 After Daubert, general acceptance of a technique in
always possible that an empirical test will some day demonstrate the theory to be
incorrect."' (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park:
The Far-Reaching Implication of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty
of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 55, 62 (1995))).
14. 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,2002). Despite the court's initial ruling to
limit fingerprint identification testimony on January 7, 2002, the court in Lera Plaza
reversed itself on March 13, 2002. United States v. Llera Plaza, Cr. No. 98-362-10,
2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,2002). However, the court's decision to "changef[
[its] mind" fails to diminish the fact that defense attorneys will continue to call for the
exclusion of fingerprint identification testimony on reliability grounds. Id. at 022.
15. For example, several federal courts have recently limited the admission of
handwriting analysis testimony in the courtroom. See infra note 327 and
accompanying text. The court in Llera Plaza used one court's reasoning in a
handwriting evidence case to make its January 7. 2002, determination to admit
fingerprint evidence. 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516-17 (citing United States v. Hines, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999)).
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17. See Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert,
Joiner, Kumho Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?,
33 UWLA L. Rev. 87,88 (2001).
1& See infra text accompanying notes 162-64.
19. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
20. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
21. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. Although Daubert is a
Supreme Court case that held Rule 702 superseded the Frye standard, neither
2002] 2821
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the scientific community became only one of several factors for a
federal judge to evaluate when deciding whether to exclude expert
testimony on scientific issues.? Daubert placed increased emphasis on
the overall reliability of proffered scientific evidence. In Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, another civil case, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the factors it had listed in Daubert applied to technical, as well as
scientific, knowledge.'
The overall impact of Daubert on judicial decision-making in
criminal cases has been less than dramatic, as expert scientific
testimony regarding forensic evidence has continued to be routinely
admitted. As one judge wrote after allowing the admission of
fingerprint evidence at trial, "[t]he court's decision may strike some as
comparable to a breathless announcement that the sky is blue and the
sun rose in the east yesterday. Nevertheless, Daubert and Kumho Tire
invite fresh and critical looks at old habits and beliefs. ' '24
However, the few changes that have occurred under the new
standards for admission have been significant. On occasion, the
reconsideration of scientific evidence under Daubert has resulted in
the exclusion of long-accepted scientific techniques in criminal cases,'
Most notably, on January 7, 2002, after a pre-trial Daubert hearing to
consider the admissibility of fingerprint evidence, Judge Louis Pollak
excluded expert testimony regarding fingerprints as unreliable.26 The
court's January 7, 2002, decision in United States v. Llera Plaza
represented the first exclusion of fingerprint evidence on reliability
grounds in the history of fingerprints.' While the court ultimately
Daubert nor Rule 702 governs state courts. The Court in Daubert was construing a
federal evidentiary rule-Rule 702-and not ruling on a constitutional issue. Rhoda
B. Billings, Expert Testimony to Accommodate the Frye, Daubert, and Kumho Tire
Standards of Admissibility, 54 Okla. L. Rev. 613, 618 (2001). Thus, states are still free
to adopt their own evidentiary standards. Although a further discussion of state
expert testimony practices is beyond the scope of this Note, it suffices to say that
many state courts continue to apply Frye today. See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye,
Again: The Past, Present, & Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 Jurimetrics J.
385, 386-87 (2001) (listing Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington as states that still
applied Frye in the year 2001). A number of other state courts have adopted
evidentiary standards based on Rule 702 and Daubert. See infra note 164 and
accompanying text.
22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
23. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
24. United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 849 (S.D. Ind. 2000), affd, 260
F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,
2002) (excluding, in part, expert testimony comparing fingerprints), vacated, Cr. No.
98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002); United States v. Hines, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999) (excluding, in part, expert testimony comparing
handwriting samples).
26. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
27. See Simon A. Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and
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reversed itself on March 13, 2002, the debate about the admission of
fingerprint evidence at trial is far from over.
This Note attempts to connect the scientific techniques used in
fingerprinting, as well as the scientific premises that underlie these
techniques, with the judicial evaluation of fingerprint evidence in the
courtroom. As a closer analysis of Judge Pollak's decisions in Liera
Plaza will show, DauberP fails to provide sufficient assistance to
judges ruling on expert scientific testimony. Daubert is the reality
with which courts must work; within that reality, however, courts are
struggling. The decisions rendered in Llera Plaza on January 7, 2002,
and March 13, 2002, highlight the confusion over the Daubert
standard as well as the areas where courts should more thoroughly
analyze the reliability of scientific techniques and the admission of
testimony about these techniques in the courtroom.
While fingerprints have long been recognized as a unique human
characteristic that could be used for identification purposes z2 modem
forensic techniques are rooted in more recent history2" Part I
discusses how fingerprints are formed and the special characteristics
of fingerprints that make them a valuable law enforcement tool. This
part also details the history of fingerprinting in two ways. First, it
examines the development of fingerprinting techniques for
identification purposes31 and the application of these techniques in a
criminal law context.32  Second, Part I discusses the historical
introduction of fingerprint evidence in the courtroom.-"-
Criminal Identification 4 (2001) (discussing the absence of serious challenges to
fingerprint evidence's "fundamental reliability" since its acceptance by courts in the
early 1900s). Soon after the court's decision to limit the testimony of an expert
fingerprint witness in Llera Plaza, the government moved for a reconsideration of the
court's decision. The court held a three-day hearing, which began on February 25,
2002, to consider new evidence presented by the government. See Shannon P. Duffy,
Prosecutors Seek Reconsideration of Landmark Fingerprint Ruling, Legal
Intelligencer, Feb. 26, 2002, at 1. The court ultimately vacated its January 7, 2002.
decision and denied the defendant's motion to exclude the fingerprint identification
testimony proffered by the government on March 13, 2002. Llera Plaza, Cr. No. 98-
362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002), vacating 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 7,2002).
28. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
29. See Andrew C. Bernasconi, Comment, Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA
Threatens Criminal Defendants' Constitutional and Statutory Rights, 50 Am. U. L
Rev. 979, 1004 (2001) ("The use of traditional, or dermatoglyphic, fingerprints to
identify people dates back over two thousand years to ancient times, when the
Chinese used thumbprints in lieu of signatures for legal documents and criminal
confessions." (footnote omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Andre A. Moenssens, Fingerprints and the Law 1-9 (1969)
(describing the advent of modern forensic evidence).
31. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
32 See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
33. See discussion infra Part I.C.
2002] 2823
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Part II traces the path of dactylography, the science of fingerprint
identification, 4 in court. First, Part II discusses the Supreme Court's
decisions in Daubert and Kumho Tire.35 In the aftermath of these
decisions, courts must show that their determinations are not based on
a reflexive presumption of admissibility.36
Part II then analyzes Judge Pollak's recent decisions in Llera
Plaza37 in light of these prevailing evidentiary standards. 3  While
Daubert and Kumho Tire encourage a fresh look at long-accepted
scientific evidence, 39 and despite the debatable reliability of
fingerprint matches made by experts in court, judges have continued
to routinely admit fingerprint identification testimony in the 1990s.40
This part uses the Llera Plaza decision to highlight the discord
between the federal standard for admissibility of expert testimony
enunciated in Daubert and Kumho Tire, and the practical application
of this standard by courts.
Part III argues for more uniformity in courts' evaluations of expert
scientific testimony, particularly fingerprint identification testimony,
in light of the issues discussed in Parts I and II. It demonstrates, using
Judge Pollak's opinions in Llera Plaza as a starting point, how courts
often fail to apply Daubert in a manner helpful to future courts. By
fleshing out Judge Pollak's opinions in greater detail, Part III shows
the need for courts to thoroughly analyze testimony about long-
accepted scientific evidence and to clearly explain their reasoning.
Only with better guidance from the courts can individuals regain the
certainty and stability they deserve from the justice system.
Part III also suggests a partial solution to the perceived unreliability
of fingerprint identification testimony. As shown by Judge Pollak's
detailed but incomplete application of Daubert and Kumho Tire to
fingerprint identification testimony on January 7, 2002, and his
subsequent reversal of himself on March 13, 2002, the status of
fingerprint evidence remains uncertain. Although the concepts
underlying the evidentiary value of fingerprints are complex, the
actual application of identification techniques is an uncomplicated
function that juries are capable of performing. Allowing the jury to
assume this function may help reduce the challenges to reliability that
34. Craig A. Coppock, Contrast, An Investigator's Basic Reference Guide to
Fingerprint Identification Concepts 3 (2001).
35. See discussion infra Part II.A.
36. Courts have found numerous ways to fit fingerprint evidence into the post-
Daubert evidentiary world. See, e.g., United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848
(S.D. Ind. 2000), affid, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
37. 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002
WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
38. See discussion infra Part II.B.
39. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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courts have to consider when admitting fingerprint identification
testimony stating that two fingerprints "match."
Thus, this part argues that while Judge Pollak's reasoning in his
January 7, 2002, decision in Llera Plaza needed to be more thorough,
the result Judge Pollak reached when he excluded expert testimony
concerning fingerprints was fair. Judge Pollak's subsequent decision
to admit all fingerprint identification testimony on March 13, 2002,
should not overshadow the court's valuable analysis in its January 7,
2002, ruling.
I. THE HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND ITS USE AS SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. What Are Fingerprints?
The configurations of lines at the end of human fingers and thumbs
on the palmar side of the hands are commonly called "fingerprints."' ,
The term also encompasses the lines on the palms of the hands and on
the soles of the feet.4 2 Scholars often refer to fingerprints as "friction
ridges" or "papillary ridges,"43 each of which describes the unique
formation of fingerprints in humans and in other animal life.*
"Fingerprint" is also a word that describes the impression left behind
when a person touches something with the tips of the fingers. 5
Fingerprints typically begin to form in utero through a random
process during the first four to six weeks of gestation.' Because they
41. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 532 (William H. L. Dornette, ed., 5th
Unabridged Lawyers' ed. 1984) [hereinafter Medical Dictionary].
42. Coppock, supra note 34, at 3.
43. Id at 3, 12; see also Medical Dictionary, supra note 41, at 1022 (defining
papillary ridges, or "papillae corii" as "superficial projections of the.., dermis
that... contain vascular loops and specialized nerve endings, and are arranged in
ridgelike lines best developed in the hand and foot").
44. Coppock, supra note 34, at 4 ("Most all Homo sapiens exhibit friction ridge
detail on the gripping surfaces of the hands and feet. Other primates can also have
these friction ridges on their gripping surfaces. Some primates are even known to
have friction ridges on the underside of the tail ... .
45. Infra text accompanying note 56.
46. Mary Brandon et al., "Cloned" Primates and the Possibility of Identical
Fingerprints, The Print, September/October 1997, at 1-5,
http://www.scafo.orglibrary/130501.html (last visited Mar. 12,2002). The formation is
described as follows:
Together, fetal environment, in conjunction with genetically programmed
development, play an essential role in the formation of what becomes
friction skin. Beginning around the third month of fetal life, observable
ridge detail begins to form and is apparent by the fifth month of gestation in
humans. The general pattern of a finger is influenced by heredity, while the
papillary minutiae are a result of stress and variable pressure on the tactile
surfaces as the points fuse into lines during in utero development. Ridge
alignment, ridge shape, minutiae location and the location of pore openings
on the ridge unit, all evolve randomly.
2002] 2825
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are formed as a result of a random process, fingerprints differ from
finger to finger on every individual.4 7 They also differ between
individuals, including identical twins." This characteristic of
fingerprints is known as the "uniqueness" factor. Rare genetic
defects, however, can impair or delay the normal development of
fingerprints.49 As a result, most, but not all, people are born with a
complete set of fingerprints.50
Fingerprints are contained in the epidermis (the outermost layer of
human skin) but they are imprinted in, and generated from, the
dermis (the thick layer of tissue underlying the epidermis). 51 Thus, a
fingerprint will not be destroyed unless damage to the skin reaches the
dermis.52 Moreover, fingerprints remain unchanged from infancy until
death; while they may expand or contract based on the weight of the
individual, the pattern remains static.5 3 This characteristic is known as
the "permanency" factor.
Sweat pores are also found on the surface of the skin.' 4 These pores
typically form, like the development of friction ridges, in utero.55
These pores allow lubrication of the palmar surface of the hand. As a
result, fingerprints can be retrieved from various surfaces, such as
glass or metal, because sweat or other fluids, such as grease, flow
along the finger's "friction" ridges, thereby leaving an impression. 6
Id. (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002) (describing expert testimony that genetics, environment,
chemicals, disease, and other factors affect the development of fingerprints), vacated,
Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
47. Robert D. Olsen, Sr., Scott's Fingerprint Mechanics 11 (1978) ("Each of the
ten fingers on every person's hands bears its own individual and distinctive trademark
in its ridge pattern and characteristics."); see infra text accompanying note 63.
48. Coppock, supra note 34, at 21 ("[Identical] twins will often share similar
fingerprint patterns and shapes, yet the spatial relationships of the friction skin's
finely detailed characteristics still vary.").
49. Id. at 3. For example, dysplasia, a condition that causes abnormal skin
development, may result in fingerprints that contain noticeably fragmented ridges.
Id.; see also Medical Dictionary, supra note 41, at 434 (defining dysplasia).
50. See Coppock, supra note 34, at 4.
51. Id. at 12-13.
52. Id. at 14-15 ("Most minor burns, blisters, and warts only affect the top-most
epidermis layer of the skin. The normal healing process gradually replaces the
epidermis layer with new skin. This new skin will again reflect the ridge structure of
the dermis layer.").
53. The first person to publish information about the unchanging nature of
fingerprints was German scientist Herman Welcker in 1897. Joe Nickell & John F.
Fischer, Crime Science: Methods of Forensic Detection 114 (1999). For a further
discussion of permanency, see infra text accompanying note 64 (discussing research of
Sir Francis Galton).
54. Coppock, supra note 34, at 12-13. Human fingers can contain as many as three
thousand sweat pores per square inch. Colin Beavan, Fingerprints: The Origins of
Crime Detection and the Murder Case that Launched Forensic Science 14 (2001).
55. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,
2002), vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
56. See John D. Ferrara, Latent Print Processing 8 (1990) (training manual for
2826 [Vol. 70
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B. Fingerprints as a Means of Identifying Individuals
1. The Development of Fingerprinting as a Science
Although the Chinese used thumbprints to "sign" criminal
confessions over two thousand years ago,' fingerprints were not used
for identification purposes in criminal investigations until much later.
In 1880, Dr. Henry Faulds, a Scottish missionary, published the first
known paper to suggest that criminals could be identified by their
fingerprints.58 He also observed the regeneration of fingerprints after
"shaving off the ridges which contained the patterns near the
fingertips till no pattern should be traced."59
Meanwhile, Sir Francis Galton had begun to experiment with a
system of classifying fingerprints.' Galton, an anthropologist, divided
fingerprints into three main patterns that are still used in most modern
classification systems: loop, arch, and whorl." In addition, he
developed the concepts of uniqueness and permanency, which
underlie the use of fingerprinting technology in criminal trials. 2
Galton determined that individuals possess different fingerprints on
each of their ten fingers (uniqueness),' and that "though the pattern
as a whole may become considerably altered in length or breadth, the
number of ridges, their embranchments, and other minutiae remain
unchanged" (permanency).'
Sir Edward Henry further developed Galton's system of fingerprint
categorization.' In the "Henry" system, loops, arches, and whorls,
the three basic fingerprint patterns, were further divided into
New York City ("NYC") Police Officers written by Former Commanding Officer of
the NYC Latent Print Unit).
57. Bernasconi, supra note 29, at 1004.
58. Beavan, supra note 54, at xiv; Bernasconi, supra note 29, at 1004. But see
Robert D. Foote, Fingerprint Identification: A Survey of Present Technology,
Automated Applications and Potential For Future Development, Criminal Justice
Monograph, Vol. V, No. 2, 1974, at 3 [hereinafter Criminal Justice Monograph]
(citing a lecture by Thomas Taylor, a scientist working for the United States federal
government in 1877, as potentially the first public presentation of the idea that
fingerprints could aid in criminal identification).
59. Criminal Justice Monograph, supra note 58, at 3 (quoting an article by Henry
Faulds in the publication The Hidden Hand).
60. Id at 4.
61. Simon A. Cole suggests that Galton's decision to divide fingerprints into three
groups was a result of the difficulty he experienced when he attempted to divide his
own empirical data into the nine groups suggested by a predecessor. Cole, supra note
27, at 77-79. Galton may have devised as many as sixty categories of fingerprints
before retreating to his conclusion that all prints generally had either an arch, whorl,
or loop pattern. Id
62. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text (discussing the permanency and
uniqueness of fingerprints).
63. Criminal Justice Monograph, supra note 58, at 4.




approximately eight subcategories. 6 For example, within the arch
pattern, a pattern accounting for approximately five percent of all
fingerprints, Henry described two different patterns: plain arch and
tented arch.67 The term "plain arch" describes horizontal fingerprint
ridges with a subtle arch in the middle of the finger, while the
fingerprint ridges of a "tented arch" form a steeper, bell-curve
pattern.' Loop prints comprise sixty-five percent of all fingerprint
patterns.69 They have a circular pattern that loops back within itself in
a spiral, and include two subdivisions: radial and ulnar. ° Whorls,
which are generally circular, account for the remaining thirty percent
of fingerprint patterns.71  The whorl category is divided into four
subcategories: plain, central pocket, double loop, and accidental.72
Henry's method of classification was adopted by the United
Kingdom at the turn of the twentieth century. 73 The system was
adopted, in part, because it presented a simple, cost effective, and
speedy alternative to other methods of identifying criminal suspects. 74
However, while fingerprinting techniques adopted by the United
Kingdom, and later the United States, typically combined Faulds's
idea that fingerprints would be a useful tool for identifying criminals
and Henry's categorization of fingerprint types, the work of Galton
truly substantiated fingerprinting as a science.75
66. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 117. Although discussions of fingerprint
categorization often focus on the eight subdivisions of Henry's classification system,
Johannes Evangelist Purkinje had developed an extensive fingerprint categorization
system while studying in Poland in 1823, containing nine different types of prints.
Criminal Justice Monograph, supra note 58, at 2.
67. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 117.
68. Coppock, supra note 34, at 16.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 117, 120.
71. Coppock, supra note 34, at 17. But see Cynthia A. Meade, Fingerprints as
Clues to Skin Development, at http://www.science.subaru.comteachingjideas/
cynthiameade.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (classifying fingerprint patterns as
whorl, double whorl, accidental, radial loop, ulnar loop, and tinted arch).
72. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 117. An "accidental" whorl refers to a
fingerprint that contains an amalgamation of print characteristics and thus fits into
none of the three main categories neatly. See id. at 120.
73. See Beavan, supra note 54, at xv; Bernasconi, supra note 29, at 1004. Sir
Edward Henry was ultimately promoted to Commissioner of Scotland Yard in 1905.
Beavan supra note 54, at 13.
74. See Criminal Justice Monograph, supra note 58, at 1-2, 5. For example,
photographic identification of suspects was considered flawed, in part, because human
appearance is so easily altered. Id. at 1. Fingerprints, however, are impossible to alter
and difficult to obliterate entirely. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
However, perhaps one of the primary reasons fingerprints have endured without
extensive scrutiny by law enforcement officials and courts for so many years is that
they are a relatively cheap and quick method of identification.
75. Criminal Justice Monograph, supra note 58, at 4 ("It was probably due to the
efforts of Galton more than any other person that fingerprints were accepted as a
scientific method of identification."); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint
Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 13, 31-32, 36 (2002) (adding
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Galton devised a method for identifying fingerprints by comparing
fixed points that occur with regularity in fingerprints. 6 Today, these
points are known as "Galton points" or "Galton details."'  They are
also referred to as "ridge characteristics," "ridge details," or "points of
similarity."78 Galton identified several minutiae that appeared from
time to time on the fingertips. 9 For example, Galton's "ridge dot"
point consisted of a friction ridge that was wider than it was long.
After locating points of identification on an unidentified fingerprint,
fingerprint examiners would look for the same points in the
fingerprint of a known individual. The number of points of detail
being compared could vary, depending on the size of the fingerprints
being compared. If the prints matched each other at the points
examined, the fingerprints were considered identical. Because
fingerprints were considered unique, if identical prints were found,
examiners would conclude that both prints belonged to the same
person.
What emerged from the combined work of the pioneering
individuals described above was a method for humans to determine
whether or not the fingerprint of a known individual matched a
fingerprint found at a crime scene or on a piece of incriminating
evidence.81 Fingerprints were seen as a reliable identification tool
because of their uniqueness and permanency.'
that the American recognition of fingerprint identification techniques in the
courtroom stemmed from the "cultural plausibility" of the uniqueness of fingerprints
and the certainty with which expert witnesses spoke of fingerprint identification
techniques).
76. See Cole, supra note 27, at 79-80.
77. See id. at 79. Galton ultimately calculated that the probability of two identical
fingerprints was one in sixty-four billion. Id. at 80.
78. Id. at 79.
79. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 125.
80. While the idea of using ridge characteristics to compare fingerprints has been
attributed to Galton, the points of comparison he identified are but a sampling of
those used by fingerprint examiners today. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 125-26
(naming ridge endings and bifurcations, the branching of one ridge in two directions,
as points of identification in addition to those specifically named by Galton).
81. Fingerprint identification techniques have not changed dramatically since
their inception in the early 1900s. See James Holt, Finger Prints Simplified: A
Handbook of the Science of Finger Print Identification (1920); Frederick Kuhne, The
Finger Print Instructor (2d ed. 1935) (written by a former sergeant of the New York
City Police Department Bureau of Criminal Identification); infra Part I.B.2.
82. More than seventy years after investigators began to use fingerprints in
criminal trials, the popularity for this identification tool had not waned. As one law
enforcement official wrote in 1978, "[flingerprints are the most positive means of
identifying individuals. Of all the methods of identification, fingerprinting alone has
proved to be both infallible and practical." Olsen, supra note 47, at 5. However,
fingerprints were not used exclusively in criminal investigations. They were also a
convenient tool for governments interested in tracking "suspect" populations, see
Cole, supra note 27, at 3 (opining that the drive for fingerprint identification
techniques was caused "[n]ot [only by] criminal suspects, but also a wide range of
people considered 'suspect' and alien for other reasons: the natives of Europe's
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2. Advances in Fingerprint Technology
Fingerprints are taken from criminal suspects using a two-part
method. First, law enforcement officers apply ink to the suspect's
finger and roll the inked finger on a piece of paper with boxes labeled
for each finger of both the left and right hands. Next, "plain
impressions" are taken by pressing, not rolling, inked fingertips
directly against the paper below the labeled boxes.' This step insures
against manual error and serves as a backup impression should the
rolled print become smudged.' After prints are recorded on paper,
they are classified according to the Henry system or some variation of
the Henry systemY The rules of classification in the Henry system
mandate that a fingerprint examiner first determine whether the
pattern is an arch, whorl, or loop. 6 The technician then proceeds to
subcategorize the prints according to a complex classification system.,,
When the inked prints come from a known individual, the prints are
called exemplar prints. 88
Fingerprint examiners compare exemplar prints with fingerprints
left at a crime scene or those found on a piece of evidence. 9 These
prints fall into one of three categories. "Plastic" fingerprints are those
impressed in soft material, such as wax, putty, or dust.9° "Visible"
prints are those plainly identifiable because they appear in colored
substances such as blood, grease, or ink.91 Fingerprints obtained by
the ink and roll method fit in this category. "Latent" prints, which are
not visible to the human eye, constitute the third type of prints.92
colonies; recent immigrants; people of color; poor, mobile 'vagrants'; 'degenerates';
and prostitutes"), and for insurance companies interested in preventing false claims.
Holt, supra note 81, at 23-24. Banks, which had long sought a way to identify illiterate
customers who could not sign their names, also found fingerprint identification
methods useful. Id. at 15-16. In addition, fingerprints were used by the military to
identify personnel in situations of death and desertion. Id. at 16-17.
83. Holt, supra note 81, at 31. This process remains the same today. Cole, supra
note 27, at 75.
84. Holt, supra note 81, at 31; see Cole, supra note 27, at 75. If a careless
fingerprint technician accidentally rolls the same print twice, a comparison of the
rolled prints to the plain impressions can correct the error. See id.
85. See Coppock, supra note 34, at 25-28 (distinguishing between the classic Henry
system of classification, which required the manual filing of fingerprint cards, with the
National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") classification system, which
modernized the Henry system by computerizing fingerprint cards, and the Automated
Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS"), another computerized system).
86. See Holt, supra note 81, at 67.
87. See Coppock, supra note 34, at 25-28; see also supra note 85.
88. Coppock, supra note 34, at 6.
89. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 124-25.
90. Id. at 130.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 130-31. Latent prints are comprised primarily of sweat emitted from the




Fingerprint examiners obtain latent prints in a variety of ways.
Since the 1900s, fingerprint examiners have recovered these prints by
powdering a surface, and then dusting the powder off with a small
brush so as to differentiate the fingerprint image from its
background. 93 Light-colored powder was used for dark surfaces, while
dark-colored powder was used for light surfaces.' Investigators then
photographed the resulting image,95 and "lifted" the powdered image
and transferred it to paper using clear tape. " After classifying the
fingerprint according to the prevailing classification system,"
examiners compared a number of fixed points, or "Galton details,"''
of the exemplar image with those of the latent print."
Today, fingerprint examiners continue to use many of the
techniques developed by fingerprinting pioneers.100 However,
individuals can now be fingerprinted using either ink or an electronic
hand scan. Using a computer imaging system called Live-Scan,
fingerprint technicians, most often law enforcement officers, scan an
individual's hand and print out the resulting image. '"' This process is
both quick and efficient." 2 In addition, it lessens the likelihood that
latent prints will be smudged or destroyed during the "lifting"
process.10 3 However, one drawback to Live-Scan is that the computer
is often unable to reproduce an image as detailed or nuanced as the
inked fingerprint image."
93. Kuhne, supra note 81, at 98. Today, many additional technologies assist
fingerprint technicians in gathering prints from a crime scene. These techniques
include the use of ultraviolet light to reveal prints, and chemical fuming agents, which
bring out the print image. Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 132-35. Technicians
often use the chemical bonding compound, cyanoacrylate, found in "super glue," to
preserve prints. See Ed German, Cyanoacrylate (Superghe) Fuming Tips, Latent Print
Examination (1999), at http://onin.comlfp/cyanoho.htmi (last modified Sept. 16. 1999).
94. Kuhne, supra note 81, at 98.
95. Id.
96. Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, The
Science of Fingerprints: Classification and Uses 177-78 (1977) [hereinafter Science of
Fingerprints].
97. Id. at 192-95; see also supra note 85.
98. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
100. See Interview with Rose Gribben, New York City Police Officer in charge of
Latent Fingerprints for the Twentieth Precinct, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 1, 2002); see
also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
101. See Coppock, supra note 34, at 33-35 (describing the computer technology of
Live-Scan).
102. See id. at 34.
103. See Nickell & Fischer, supra note 53, at 130 (describing the "delicate nature"
of latent prints).
104. Coppock, supra note 34, at 35. However, Coppock seems to indicate that the
benefits to this technology far outweigh the drawbacks, because latent prints
recovered from crime scenes are often clearer than the inked prints generated in
practice. See id. As Seth DuCharme, a former Deputy U.S. Marshall confirmed,
criminal suspects are often talented at smudging their fingerprints during ink and roll
fingerprinting, thus making the job of the fingerprint technician difficult. Interview
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Both DNA and fingerprint evidence are cataloged in national law
enforcement databases; however, unlike DNA evidence, fingerprint
evidence is not contained solely in a national database. 5 Instead,
many jurisdictions maintain separate fingerprint databases using
Automated Fingerprint Identification System ("AFIS") computers."0 6
These fingerprint identification computer systems are often linked to
larger networks, thus expanding the number of fingerprints to
compare. 107 AFIS computers enable officials to compare individual
fingerprints quickly-officers input search criteria and the computer
generates a list of likely matches.108 Once the computer generates
such a list the fingerprint examiner must compare the prints to one
another manually.' 9 In 1999, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") implemented the Integrated Automatic Fingerprint
Identification System ("IAFIS"), which contains over thirty-six
million known prints." 0 The FBI's Criminal Justice Information
Services Division also possesses the world's largest collection of
fingerprints, which can be searched manually."'
C. Acceptance of Fingerprint Identification Techniques as Scientific
Evidence in Criminal Cases
By the early 1900s, fingerprints were recognized as a unique and
permanent form of physical evidence."2 In addition, law enforcement
officers had begun to develop techniques for gathering and
categorizing fingerprints." 3 However, to use fingerprint technology to
convict criminals, expert witnesses need to testify at trial about the
identity of the individual whose prints are found at a crime scene or
on a piece of evidence. These witnesses can explain the physical
properties of fingerprints as well as the techniques used to identify the
with Seth DuCharme, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 18, 2002). However, some fingerprint
examiners still prefer the familiarity of the ink and roll method to the Live-Scan
method. Interview with Rose Gribben, supra note 100.
105. While state and local law enforcement agencies may access the national FBI
fingerprint database, these agencies often maintain separate databases. Telephone
Interview with Dr. Lawrence Kobilinsky, Associate Provost and Professor of Forensic
Science at John Jay College of Criminal Justice (Mar. 22,2002). As a result, state and
local law enforcement agencies may not be able to access each other's fingerprint
databases, making the search for criminals "on the lam" more difficult.
106. Coppock, supra note 34, at 111-12.
107. Id. at 115.
108. Id. at 111-19. As Coppock notes, "[flingerprint pattern types that are used as
database search parameters can vary among the different manufacturers of AFIS
computers.... [But tjhe software itself is designed to compare the spatial
relationships of fingerprint characteristics." Id. at 112, 115.
109. Id. at 115 ("AFIS computers do not make identifications.").
110. FBI Laboratory: Latent Print Unit, at http://www.fbi.govlhq/lab/orgflpu.htm
(last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
111. See id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
113. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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owner of a fingerprint. In addition, the expert can give his or her
opinion as to the identity of the person to whom the fingerprint
belongs if a known and an unidentified fingerprint match. Because of
the respect that juries pay to expert witnesses, this fingerprint
identification testimony is exceptionally powerful."4
In 1902, fingerprint evidence was first used to obtain a criminal
conviction in England.115 The United States followed England's lead,
and, in 1908, began to develop a nationwide fingerprinting system."6
However, acceptance of fingerprinting as a science was slow-the line
between scientific technique and "quackery" had not yet clearly
developed." 7  In addition, law enforcement officials were slow to
abandon anthropometry, also called the Bertillon method, a science
that identified criminals by their body measurements, as their
preferred identification technique."18
In 1911, the first American was convicted for murder using the
testimony of fingerprint identification experts in People v. Jennings.",
The Jennings case was tried in Illinois state court. Thus, the court's
determination did not bind federal courts or other state courts.
However, Jennings paved the way for the introduction of expert
testimony regarding fingerprint evidence in several states, including
New York, New Jersey, and Nevada.'2  Courts that were once
hesitant to trust fingerprint evidence endorsed this evidence without a
great deal of analysis after the Jennings decision.'2' By 1932, expert
testimony regarding fingerprints was regularly accepted in American
courts.12 At that time, only five states had not yet accepted
fingerprint identification techniques as valid scientific evidence.' "3
The court opinions from the early twentieth century reveal an
alarming lack of judicial examination into the soundness of
114. Cf. infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (illustrating how easily even
judges were impressed by fingerprint identification testimony).
115. Beavan, supra note 54, at xv.
116. Bernasconi, supra note 29, at 1005. By 1999, approximately ninety years after
the United States first developed a system of fingerprint identification, the FBI
created a computer system able to store over sixty-five million fingerprints. Beavan,
supra note 54, at xvi. The system has not yet reached capacity. See supra text
accompanying note 110.
117. See Beavan, supra note 54, at 8.
118. See Criminal Justice Monograph, supra note 58, at 2.
119. 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911); Beavan, supra note 54, at xv. Jennings was convicted
of murder and executed on February 16, 1912. Mnookin, supra note 75, at 17 n.14.
120. See Bernasconi, supra note 29, at 1006; Saks, supra note 7, at 1101. The
following cases cited Jennings in their decisions to admit fingerprint evidence: Moon
v. State, 198 P. 288, 291 (Ariz. 1921); Lanible v. State, 114 A. 346, 348 (NJ. 1921);
Commonwealth v. Loomis, 113 A. 428, 431 (Pa. 1921); State v. Kuhl, 175 P. 190, 195
(Nev. 1918); People v. Roach, 109 N.E. 618,623 (N.Y. 1915).
121. See Mnookin, supra note 75, at 21; Saks. supra note 7, at 1100-01.
122. Bernasconi, supra note 29, at 1006.
123. Saks, supra note 7, at 1101.
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fingerprinting techniques. 4 Judges casually cited criminal treatises or
other cases that had admitted fingerprint evidence.'25 For example,
Michael Saks points out that
Nowhere in the [Jennings] opinion.., does the court articulate the
basis of the expertise it is evaluating, or discuss any scientific
evidence bearing on empirical claims, or illuminate the technique's
theoretical premises, or explain why anyone should believe that
fingerprint examiners can do what they claim the ability to do. 26
Scholars argue about how and why the Jennings case propelled
fingerprints into a category of judicially-accepted scientific
evidence.'27 In Jennings, the court recognized that fingerprint
evidence was a matter of first impression in American courts. 28
However, the court found exemplary support for print evidence in the
United Kingdom, "where it ha[d] been used since 1891 in thousands
of cases without error."'2 9 In addition, the court determined that the
prosecution's four expert witnesses, who testified that they had
compared the fingerprints of the defendant with those found at the
crime scene, and had concluded that the fingerprints matched, were
qualified as experts because they had compared fingerprints in
numerous instances in the past. 30
The court compared fingerprint evidence to other types of evidence
of which courts had at first been suspicious, but which were later
"admitted without question.' 31 These types of evidence included
photographs, X-rays, and microscope evidence. 32  The court
ultimately held that fingerprints, as a "method of identification," were
124. See Mnookin, supra note 75, at 43 ("[N]ineteenth century judges did not
scrutinize fingerprinting (or other forensic sciences) carefully...
125. Saks, supra note 7, at 1101.
126. Id. at 1101-02.
127. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 75, at 17-22; Saks, supra note 7, at 1100-06.
While both Jennifer Mnookin and Michael Saks agree that the Jennings court did not
scrutinize fingerprinting techniques before admitting fingerprint identification
testimony, each scholar offers a slightly different interpretation of how and why this
occurred.
128. People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1081 (111 1911).
129. Id. at 1081. Much appears amiss in the court's analysis. First, historical
accounts of fingerprint evidence show that the use of this evidence did not begin in
the United Kingdom until the turn of the twentieth century. Supra text accompanying
note 115. Second, even if fingerprint evidence had been used in cases "thousands of
times," the court prematurely stated that the use of this evidence was "without error."
After all, the techniques had only been in use for approximately ten years at the time
of this opinion. Id.; see also, Mnookin, supra note 75, at 20 ("[T]he judge in Jennings
was simply overstating the extent of acceptance of fingerprinting outside the
courtroom at the time.").





"in such general and common use that the courts [could] not refuse to
take judicial cognizance of it.' ' 33
One scholar has described the judicial attitude towards fingerprints
after Jennings as "[w]e're letting so much else in, we might as well let
this in, too.""3 After a number of legal decisions characterized by the
same dearth of reasoning as Jennings,3 state courts seemed to have
determined that a sufficient foundation for fingerprint evidence had
been laid so as to permit them to refer to the previous fingerprint
identification decisions as precedent.'- Or, as one scholar suggests,
were these courts just being lazy?137
In 1923, in Frye v. United States, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court enunciated a standard for expert scientific testimony known
today as the "general acceptance" test.' Although the court in this
murder trial was addressing polygraph, 39 rather than fingerprint,
evidence, the standard it used closely resembled the standard used by
the Jennings court. "40 Even though Frye was not controlling on any
state or federal jurisdiction except the District of Columbia Circuit,
most federal and state courts adopted some version of the Frye
standard.141
The court in Frye posited that scientists, who work in the particular
field of science at issue, are the individuals best able to determine
what is "real" science and what is "junk"' 42 science. 4" Thus, the court
reasoned, scientists should be the primary determiners of which sorts
133. Id
134. Saks, supra note 7, at 1104. Professor Saks refers to the evidentiary standard
for expert scientific testimony before 1923 as the "implicit marketplace test," because
judges often evaluated evidence by "whether consumers... found it useful in
important everyday affairs of life outside the courtroom." Id. at 1129.
135. See, e.g., Moon v. State, 198 P. 288 (Ariz. 1921); Harold v. Lamble, 114 A. 346
(NJ. 1921); Commonwealth v. Loomis, 113 A. 428 (Pa. 1921); State v. Kuhl, 175 P.
190 (Nev. 1918); People v. Roach, 109 N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1915).
136. Saks, supra note 7, at 1104-05.
137. Id at 1105 ("The courts of other states that contented themselves with citing
Jennings and its progeny were being lazy.").
138. Frye vs. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
139. Specifically, the evidence before the court in Frye was called the "systolic
blood pressure deception test." Id. at 1013. This test was a predecessor of today's
polygraph test. See Encyclopedia of Crime & Justice 1377 (Joshua Dressier, ed., 2d
ed. 2002) [hereinafter Crime & Justice].
140. People v. Ferguson, 526 N.E.2d 525, 532 (II1. 1988) ("[While Jennings
predated the Frye decision, the test it set up for the admissibility of evidence is not
unlike the 'general acceptance' test articulated in Frye.").
141. Lisa Gonzalez, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and
Demise of Frye v. United States, 48 U. Miami L Rev. 371, 372 (1993). Yet some
courts rejected Frye altogether. Id.
142. One scholar defines "junk" science as "opinions based on unproved and
unprovable [sic] hypotheses in claimed areas of expertise that were outside the range
of scientific disciplines considered to be legitimate." Billings. supra note 21. at 615.
143. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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of scientific evidence are admissible.' 44 When a technique was said to
be "generally accepted" in the scientific community, testimony
concerning it was considered admissible under Frye. 45  The court
noted, "the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.' 46  Although Frye no longer
represents the federal evidentiary standard for scientific evidence, 47
many state courts still follow Frye.14
As with any judicial standard that withstands the test of time, the
"general acceptance" rule had both its detractors and its supporters. 49
Some believed the Frye test was too restrictive, because it usually took
a long time for scientific communities to recognize novel techniques. 50
Others claimed that Frye rested on the faulty premise that jurors are
unduly influenced by scientific evidence.'
One might also argue that the Frye test's practical effect was
somewhat arbitrary, because techniques that were developed and
accepted by federal courts before Frye were not subject to the same
limitations to which novel scientific techniques were subject after
Frye.52  For example, fingerprint identification testimony was
routinely admitted by courts before the Frye decision, and therefore
never subject to the rigors of the Frye test, which required expert
scientific testimony to be "generally accepted" by the scientific
community. 53 The only "community" by which fingerprint testimony
was ever generally accepted was the judicial community.
144. Crime & Justice, supra note 139, at 1378 ("[T]he 'requirement of general
acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the
general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice."' (quoting
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974))).
145. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
146. Id. at 1014.
147. See infra text accompanying note 167.
148. See Carrie C. Coppage, The Revolution of the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence with Print Identification as a Model, 24 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 609, 611 (2001);
supra note 21. The populations of those states that still apply Frye account for half of
the United States population. Bernstein, supra note 21, at 386-87. New York and
California, for example, still use the Frye standard of general acceptance. Id.
149. Compare Coppage, supra note 148, at 611 ("The Frye test is extremely
lax .... ), with Crime & Justice, supra note 139, at 1378-79 ("[Cjourts favoring the
general acceptance test recognize its conservative nature but believe this aspect does
not exact an 'unwarranted cost."' (quoting Addison, 498 F.2d at 743)).
150. Coppage, supra note 148, at 612; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
151. See Crime & Justice, supra note 139, at 1379. However, some scholars argue
that the idea of jurors as "overwhelmed" by scientific evidence has empirical support.
See id.
152. See Coppage, supra note 148, at 612.
153. Cf Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-
Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 251, 272 (1997) ("[Handwriting examiners')
testimony as expert witnesses was well grounded in precedent long before the general
acceptance test was announced, and therefore the Frye test was not needed to
determine the admissibility of handwriting identification testimony.").
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The judicial evaluation of the reliability of scientific evidence was
exactly what the court in Frye had attempted to prevent. This task,
according to the court, would be better left to scientists themselves.,,
However, the court could not make the application of its ruling
retroactive. Thus, as shown by the Jennings and Frye decisions,
fingerprints were never subjected to the same level of judicial
exactitude as other evidentiary techniques. Had fingerprints been
subjected to the Frye standard over seventy years ago, they might
never have been deemed admissible evidence.
II. THE RECENT CONFUSION ABOUT THE PROPER APPLICATION OF
EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY IN CRIMINAL CASES
Part I described the development of fingerprint identification
methods in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Because
of their uniqueness and permanency, fingerprints soon gained
acceptance among courts as a legitimate form of evidence. However,
the increased use of scientific evidence, such as fingerprints, prompted
courts to create clearer standards for admissibility."5  This part
analyzes the different guidelines set forth by courts to ensure that only
reliable evidence gained admission at trial. It was only fair that
unreliable scientific testimony, which could improperly influence a
jury, be excluded. In addition, this part analyzes how the judicial
standards for expert scientific testimony have been interpreted, using
the decisions in United States v. Llera Plaza, ' a recent district court
case involving fingerprint evidence, to highlight the confusion that
persists in this field.
A. From "General Acceptance" to Daubert: The MurkY State of the
Law on Scientific Evidence
Approximately fifty years after the establishment of the Frye test in
1923, little had changed. Federal courts continued to use the general
acceptance test to admit novel scientific techniques in criminal
cases.157 However, a fissure became apparent in this seemingly solid
154. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
155. Although Frye was a brief decision, the "general acceptance" standard the
court described was not necessarily easy to apply. Many struggled with how to
"identify[] the field in which the underlying principle [fell]," and then how to
"determin[e] whether that principle ha[d] been generally accepted by members of the
identified field." Crime & Justice, supra note 139, at 1378. Moreover, judges in
different jurisdictions applying Frye often reached different conclusions about the
same scientific technique, thus leading to increased uncertainty among litigants. See
Bernstein, supra note 21, at 390.
156. 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002
WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
157. Interestingly, the general acceptance test was applied almost exclusively to
criminal cases. Bernstein supra note 21, at 389 ("[Flew courts considered the types of
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standard when, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence became law.' 8
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules provided: "If scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 15 9
Under Rule 702, some scholars believed the proponent of the
evidence needed only to show that evidence was "generally relevant"
to gain admission at trial.160 This standard seemed to clash with the
Frye test's requirement of general acceptance in the scientific
community. Rule 702 shifted the evaluation of expert scientific
testimony away from the scientific community, on which the Frye test
had focused, and back to judges."' As a result, some federal courts,
finding Rule 702 more permissive than Frye, adopted this rule as the
controlling standard for the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony.1 62 Other federal courts interpreted the two standards in
such a way that they would not conflict with one another.63 These
courts were then free to apply each standard as they saw fit.' 61
Thus, by the 1990s, the federal standard for admission of expert
scientific testimony varied greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.65
In 1993, the Supreme Court stepped in to resolve the controversy over
which rule, Frye or Rule 702, applied to expert testimony in federal
court.166 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court
rejected Frye as the controlling federal standard for the admission of
expert scientific evidence presented in a typical civil case... to be based on a novel
scientific technique within the meaning of the Frye rule."). Yet, fingerprint
identification testimony was routinely admitted by federal courts without reference to
the Frye test, because it had been accepted by courts prior to Frye. See supra text
accompanying notes 152-53.
158. Montz, supra note 17, at 93.
159. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
160. Coppage, supra note 148, at 612.
161. Before Frye, judges were the sole evaluators of the admissibility of expert
scientific testimony; however, the end result before Frye was similar, because judges
tended to look to the scientific community when ruling on the admissibility of expert
testimony. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial
evaluation of expert fingerprint testimony in the Jennings case).
162. Moenssens, supra note 153, at 273. One example of a federal court that
abandoned Frye in the wake of Rule 702 was the Second Circuit. Id. at 273 n.82 (citing
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978)).
163. Id. at 273 & n.83. Some scholars believed that the uncertainty about how to
interpret the Frye test gave courts flexibility in their evaluation of whether Frye
conflicted with Rule 702. Id. at 273.
164. In addition, some state courts, persuaded by the actions of federal courts,
chose to adopt the new standard under Rule 702 and abandon Frye. See Coppage,
supra note 148, at 612.
165. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,586 n.4, 587 n.5 (1993).
166. See id. at 585 ("We granted certiorari ... in light of sharp divisions among the
courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony.").
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expert scientific testimony. 167 The Court found Frye inconsistent with,
and thus superseded by, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which favored
the liberal admission of evidence."6
Daubert was a products liability case involving the drug Bendectin,
which was prescribed to pregnant women for morning sickness, and
which allegedly caused birth defects.69 The trial court prohibited the
plaintiff's experts from testifying about epidemiological studies they
had conducted that linked Bendectin to birth defects, because the
evidence did not pass the Frye test. 70
The Supreme Court reversed, ultimately holding that general
acceptance alone was an inadequate measure of the reliability of
scientific evidence.17' The Court found that the Frye standard was
only one of several criteria a court could consider." In addition to
general acceptance within the scientific community, the Court
discussed the following nonexclusive list of factors a court may
consider:
(1) whether the technique or theory can be or has been tested-that
is, whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the theory
or technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the
known or potential rate of error: [and] (4) the existence and
maintenance of standards and controls.17
Thus, the Supreme Court envisioned the use of a "flexible" standard
for the admission of scientific evidence. 174
The Court further explained that under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, judges play an important role as "gatekeep[ers]" for the
admission of scientific evidence. 7' The Court stated, "under the Rules
the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."'76 The Court
surmised that while "there are no certainties in science," scientific
methods should be based on "good grounds."'"
Thus, in Daubert, the Supreme Court shifted the evidentiary focus
from an evaluation of the conclusions reached by experts to an
evaluation of the methods and techniques used to reach those
167. Id. at 589.
168. Id. at 587-89.
169. See id at 582.
170. See id at 583-85.
171. See id. at 589 ("[Frye's] austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with,
the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.").
17Z Id. at 593-94.
173. Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 Ga. L Rev. 699, 702 (1998).
174. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
175. Id. at 597.
176. Id. at 589.
177- Id at 590.
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conclusions. 178  The Court considered the jury capable of drawing
conclusions about the validity of expert scientific testimony for
themselves, especially with the aid of judges who keep a watchful eye
out for unreliable evidence.
Although some saw Daubert as an answer to the confusing muddle
of federal decisions rendered under the dual scheme of Frye and
Federal Rule of Evidence 702,179 many others felt Daubert further
obfuscated the evidentiary standard for the admission of scientific
evidence. 8' Federal courts struggled to determine whether Daubert
was more or less restrictive of scientific evidence than Frye.'8'
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
to clarify how the standard set forth in Daubert applied to
"nonexperts."''1 In Kumho Tire, the Court ruled that the Daubert
standard applied to "'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge" in
addition to scientific knowledge. 83 In addition, the Court emphasized
that the factors listed in Daubert were nonexclusive; they represented
a general suggestion for courts to treat the admission of expert
scientific testimony flexibly.)"
In 2000, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Kumho Tire,
the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended to track the path of the
Supreme Court's expert testimony jurisprudence. 85 The amendment
178. See id. at 595.
179. See Bonnie J. Davis, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert and
Foret: A Wider Gate, A More Vigilant Gatekeeper, 54 La. L. Rev. 1307, 1320-21, 1323
(1994) ("The overwhelming response to [Daubert] has been positive.... [T]he lower
courts successfully use the framework and the flexibility in the Daubert analysis....
[In sum, t]he Daubert decision... has proven to be flexible and helpful.").
180. See, e.g., James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph
Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 365, 394-95 (1996)
("[C]ommentators have generally agreed that the Daubert opinion is confusing...."),
Jodlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the
Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. Rev.
1033, 1035-36 (2001) ("Daubert has imposed a foreign and unwieldy burden on judges
who must resolve questions of scientific admissibility, lawyers who must master the
scientific theories of expert witnesses, and legal and scientific scholars searching for
meaning and direction." (citation omitted)).
181. Capra, supra note 173, at 704. Adding to the confusion, many state courts,
although not bound by the Supreme Court's decision, because it was limited to the
interpretation of a federal evidentiary standard, adopted Daubert. See supra note 164
and accompanying text. This was perhaps a result of Daubert's reputation as a more
permissible evidentiary standard. See Montz, supra note 17, at 96 ("[I]n a period of
only four years since the decision twenty-eight states either adopted the Daubert
standard, explicitly assimilated it as similar to a test already in place, or maintained a
Daubert-like test without mentioning Daubert." (internal quotations omitted)).
However, several populous states continue to use the Frye standard. See supra note
21.
182. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 149-50.




to Rule 702 stated that an expert could testify, provided that the
proffered testimony assisted the trier of fact, the expert was qualified,
and "(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3)
the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case."1
The Amendment Committee Note following the amendment to
Rule 702 observed that courts have used factors not specifically
mentioned in Daubert to evaluate the reliability of proffered expert
scientific testimony.1" The amendment to Rule 702 was not meant to
change Daubert's flexibility; instead, it reflected the need to set
minimum guarantees of evidentiary sufficiency, methodology, and
applicability."
B. In the Aftermath of Daubert: The Uncertain Status of Fingerprint
Evidence as Shown in United States v. Llera Plaza
The Supreme Court's rulings in Daubert and Kumho Tire caused
concern among advocates of forensic science. Specifically, some
wondered if these decisions signaled the "beginning of the beginning
of the end of fingerprint identification,"'1 9 because commentators saw
Daubert as inviting new challenges to the legitimacy of fingerprint
identification techniques.19 However, despite changes in the judicial
evaluation of expert scientific testimony, fingerprint evidence
remained relatively unaffected at first. Perhaps this resulted from the
longstanding acceptance of fingerprint evidence in the courtroom.
But, as federal courts around the country have applied Daubert and its
progeny over the last several years, the judicial treatment of forensic
evidence has changed.
186. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added). The full text of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence now reads
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
187. Fed. R. Evid. 702 amendment committee note (citing factors such as whether
the expert: (1) came to his or her conclusion solely for the purpose of testifying at
trial; (2) gave an opinion reached using a "field of expertise" generally known to give
reliable results; (3) drew an unfounded conclusion from a standard scientific principle;
(4) ruled out alternative explanations for his or her results; and (5) "is being as careful
as he would be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting"
(quoting Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997))).
188. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 amendment committee note.
189. Ex Ante: Fingerprints, 4 Green Bag 2d 338, 338 (2001).
190. See infra note 328 (discussing the increase in challenges to fingerprint
identification testimony since 1993).
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No clearer was this change than in District Court Judge Louis
Pollak's 9' courtroom in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on
January 7, 2002. On this date, in United States v. Llera Plaza ("Llera
Plaza I"), a federal court ruled for the first time that fingerprint
evidence did not meet the federal evidentiary standard.'9 Exercising
his gatekeeping discretion in a pre-trial evidentiary hearing conducted
to determine the admissibility of expert testimony regarding
fingerprints, also known as a Daubert hearing, Judge Pollak granted
the defendant's motion to preclude the fingerprint evidence in part
and denied the motion in part. 93
In Llera Plaza I, the court held that the government's experts could
testify to the permanency and uniqueness of fingerprints; the experts
could also point out places of comparison between two sets of
fingerprints.194 However, witnesses could not testify that the latent
fingerprints matched those of the defendants. 9 ' This was significant
because no federal judge had used his or her gatekeeping powers, as
described by the Supreme Court in Daubert and Kumho Tire, to
preclude fingerprint testimony.196 It appears that no federal judge had
ever barred fingerprint identification testimony prior to Judge
Pollak's decision in Llera Plaza L197
Judge Pollak later "changed [his] mind," in a March 13, 2002,
hearing on the government's motion for reconsideration of the court's
exclusion of proffered fingerprint identification testimony.9' This
later decision ("Llera Plaza II") vacated Llera Plaza I and denied the
defendant's motion to preclude fingerprint evidence in its entirety.199
191. Judge Pollak was educated at Harvard University and Yale University. He
clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley B. Rutledge in 1948, and was a faculty
member and former dean of both the University of Pennsylvania Law School and
Yale Law School. He has been a well-respected member of the federal bench for
over twenty years. Judge H. Pollak, Policies and Procedures,
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/procedures/pollak-policy.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2002).
192. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002),
vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 517-18.
195. Id. at 518.
196. Id. at 500 ("Several courts have addressed the issue of whether fingerprint
identifications are admissible as expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
702, and, since the Supreme Court's Daubert ruling, all have come to the conclusion
that fingerprint testimony should be admitted.").
197. See Andy Newman, Judge Rules Fingerprints Cannot Be Called a Match, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 2002, at A14 ("A judge has ruled for the first time that fingerprint
evidence.., does not meet the standards set for scientific testimony."); Joseph A.
Slobodzian, Fingerprint Experts Are Pointed Toward the Courthouse Door, Phila.
Inquirer, Jan. 27, 2002, at C03, 2002 WL 4558554 ("Pollak is the first federal judge to
bar fingerprint-identification testimony....").
198. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 389163, at *22.
199. Id. The defendants cannot appeal the court's decision in Llera Plaza H until
their trial had ended. Andy Newman, Judge Who Ruled Out Matching Fingerprints
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The court's decision in Llera Plaza I to limit fingerprint identification
testimony had prompted widespread commentary from both
proponents and adversaries of fingerprint identification testimony.2 0"
Although this decision is no longer law in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the reliability of fingerprint identification evidence is
far from settled.
The Llera Plaza case involves three defendants charged with
committing four separate "murders for hire" in Puerto Rico and
Pennsylvania.2"' The murders were allegedly committed in
furtherance of a gang-related drug conspiracy.22 The FBI recovered
several latent fingerprints on evidence connected to the murders.2"3
This evidence included fingerprints found in two separate vehicles
allegedly used in the course of the crimes.2 4 In addition, latent prints
were obtained from weapons and ammunition found in one of the
vehicles. 205 The Llera Plaza trial is the first federal capital murder
trial in Philadelphia's history.20 6
1. Judge Polak's January 7, 2002, Decision To Limit Fingerprint
Identification Testimony in Llera Plaza I
The parties in Llera Plaza I stipulated, for the pre-trial evidentiary
hearing, to rely on the record of expert scientific testimony compiled
in United States v. Mitchell,' 7 a case decided in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in 1999.23 In Mitchell, the court held a Daubert hearing
to evaluate the admissibility of fingerprint identification testimony.
After briefly describing the record in Mitchell as it pertained to
Changes His Mind, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,2002, at A27.
200. See infra notes 326,328 and accompanying text.
201. Memorandum of Law in Support of Government's Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's Exclusion of Fingerprint Opinion Testimony at 6,
United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,2002) (No. 98-362).
202 Id. at 6-7.
203. Id at 7-8.
204. Id at 7.
205. Id.
206. Jim Smith, Print Expert Says FBI Test Is Laughable: At Question Is Reliability
of Agents' Testimony, Phila. Daily News, Feb. 27,2002,2002 WL 6673164.
207. Cr. No. 96-407 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1999). Although the Mitchell court issued
no written decision, additional documents related to this case can be found on the
website of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, at
http://www.usao-edpa.com/Invest/Mitchell-Lleraldaubert.htm (lasted visited Apr. 11,
2002).
208. This stipulation was probably based on the government's plan to call some of
the same witnesses in Llera Plaza as it had called in Mitchell. See United States v.
Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 494 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, Cr. No. 98-
362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002). However, considering that
fingerprint identification testimony had always been admitted in the past, perhaps the
government agreed to the stipulation because it thought the admission of the
proffered testimony was practically certain.
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fingerprint formation and comparison, °9 the court in Llera Plaza I
began to analyze the issues raised in the defendant's motion to
preclude the government from introducing latent fingerprint
identification testimony.
The court first addressed the government's request that it recognize
the uniqueness and permanency of fingerprint evidence under Rule
201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.21° Uniqueness and permanency
"provide the basis for associating a particular fingerprint with a
particular individual, and for matching latent fingerprints with rolled
fingerprints. 2 1' Based on the testimony of a doctor who was both a
professor of gross anatomy and an embryologist, the court concluded
that fingerprint patterns remain fixed throughout individuals' lives-
hence, permanent.212
In addition, the court acknowledged the uniqueness of fingerprints
after reviewing the testimony of an algorithmist 213 who had helped
develop the FBI's Automatic Fingerprint Identification System, a
computer database used for fingerprint comparison and
identification.1  The expert testified that he had conducted two
algorithmic studies that compared 50,000 fingerprints.15  He
concluded that the probability of finding two identical fingerprints in
his first experiment, which was a comparison of full fingerprints
(approximately one square inch), was one in 10'. His second study
compared prints cropped to the size of the average latent print with
full-sized fingerprints.2 16 He concluded that the probability of finding
two identical prints in this manner was one in 10. The probability
decreased in the latter study because fewer points of comparison were
available.
That Judge Pollak did not wrestle with the issue of whether to
accept the uniqueness and permanency of fingerprints is not
surprising.217 Fingerprint concepts and fingerprinting technology have
209. The court briefly discussed what fingerprints are, and how fingerprints are
used by examiners to positively identify individuals. See id. at 495-500.
210. Rule 201(b) states in relevant part: "A judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
Fed. R. Evid. 201. In addition, Rule 201(d) states, "[a] court shall take judicial notice
if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information." Id.
211. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
212. Id. at 502.
213. An algorithm is "[a] statement or conclusion based on a sequence of steps
involving mathematical, logical, or natural rules or principles." Black's Law
Dictionary 71 (7th ed. 1999).
214. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 497; see supra notes 106-10 and accompanying
text.
215. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
216. Id.
217. Judge Pollak quickly discussed the issues of uniqueness and permanency,
spending less than one page of his analysis on this subject.
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fingerprint specialist with the FBI, and Sergeant David Ashbaugh, a
fingerprint specialist with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to
determine whether the empirical findings of fingerprint examiners
were subject to "testing" under Daubert.-" Ashbaugh testified that
fingerprint examiners use a technique known by the acronym ACE-
V-"analysis," "comparison," "evaluation," and "verification"-to
identify fingerprints.'
According to Ashbaugh, under ACE-V, examiners begin by
analyzing the overall clarity of the latent print and look for any "red
flags," which include overlapping ridge details, evidence of differing
amounts of pressure, and shadows 29 The red flags may indicate that
two prints have been deposited in the same place or that some other
contamination of the prints has occurred.3 ° Next, examiners compare
the latent print to a set of identified fingerprints ." They look at the
overall pattern of the fingerprint (loop, whorl, arch), and then
examine points of comparison between the prints (Galton points). '-'
The number of points an examiner compares differs from country
to country and from state to state. In the United States and Canada,'
fingerprint examiners can make a quantitative/qualitative
determination of how many Galton points to compare-the clearer
the print, the fewer the details that need to be matched.?' For
example, according to Meagher, if one of the two prints compared is
small but clear, an accurate comparison of the two prints is still
possible, even though few Galton points are used. - 5  Ashbaugh
further testified that the United Kingdom mandated technicians to
compare a minimum of sixteen points of comparison.23- Ashbaugh
claimed that this part of the technique is objective; however, the
227. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 498-500,507.
228. Id. at 498. For a more detailed discussion of ACE-V, see David R. Ashbaugh,
Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and
Advanced Ridgeology (1999). ACE-V is the predominant technique used by
fingerprint examiners in the United States. See Shannon P. Duffy, Federal Judge Rules
Out Fingerprint Match Opinion: Expert Testimony Does Not Meet Daubert Test of
Reliability, Pa. L. Wkly., Jan. 21, 2002, at 7.
229. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 498-99.
232- Id. at 498.
233. Neither the United States nor Canada requires the analysis of a minimum
number of common Galton points before a fingerprint match can be declared. Id. at
513.
234. Id. at 499-500.
235. Id. at 500.
236. Id. at 513. In addition, Australia requires twelve points in common for a
match, France requires sixteen points, and Sweden requires seven points. Peter




changed very little in the last one hundred years." 8 The concepts of
permanency and uniqueness have been consistently accepted by
scientists, judges, and juries alike. 19 While Judge Pollak did not
question the validity of fingerprints as a unique and permanent form
of evidence, he did reevaluate the admissibility of fingerprint
comparison evidence under Daubert.0
Using the five factors outlined in Daubert, the court in Llera Plaza I
proceeded to analyze the admissibility of the proffered expert
fingerprint comparison testimony based on the evidence set forth by
several expert witnesses in the Mitchell case. While the Supreme
Court had emphasized the flexibility of the Daubert standard, Judge
Pollak, like many judges before him, analyzed the fingerprint evidence
only according to those criteria specifically mentioned in Daubert.22'
Although it could have found ways to test the reliability of the
proffered testimony other than, or in addition to, these factors, the
court decided that they were "a proper touchstone of admissibility.122
a. Testing
The first factor considered by the court was "whether a theory or
technique... can be (and has been) tested. ' '223  Although the
government argued that fingerprint identification testimony had been
tested in courtrooms around the country for almost a century, the
court rejected this argument stating, "'[a]dversarial' testing in court is
not.., what the Supreme Court meant when it discussed testing as an
admissibility factor." 4  It reasoned that adversarial testing of
scientific evidence ran contrary to the judge's role as gatekeeper
under Rule 702 and Daubert." Instead, Judge Pollak stated that
when it used the word "testing," the Supreme Court meant testing
hypotheses to see if they are falsifiable.22 6
Judge Pollak examined the testimony of defense witness Dr. David
Stoney, a forensic scientist, prosecution witness Stephen Meagher, a
218. Supra note 100 and accompanying text.
219. Supra Part I.
220. While the standards for admission of expert scientific testimony about
fingerprints have changed, the consistent recognition of the special qualities of
fingerprints may have helped ensure the consistent admission of this evidence in
criminal matters. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
221. See infra text accompanying note 342.
222. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 504 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002),
vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,2002).
223. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)
(alteration in original)).
224. Id. at 505.
225. Id. at 506.
226. Id. at 505 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert
Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 643 (1992))).
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methodological error was difficult to calculate and accepted,
arguendo, testimony that the rate of methodological error was
,,zero.,252
In Llera Plaza I, the fingerprint experts admitted that, although the
methodological rate of error was zero, practitioner error was a valid
concern with regard to the overall rate of error in fingerprint
identifications. 3 In an attempt to prove a rate of practitioner error,
Meagher had sent the fingerprints of the defendant in the Mitchell
case to fifty-three law enforcement agencies across the United States,
along with the defendant's alleged latent fingerprints, and asked the
agencies to apply their fingerprint identification techniques to this
evidence.2 The court stated that the results of this survey showed
that nine out of thirty-four responding agencies (approximately
twenty-six percent) failed to make an identification, citing reasons
such as insufficient time, inexperience, and "just screw[ing] up." 5
The court in Llera Plaza I concluded that these results "fall far short
of establishing a 'scientific' rate of error" in the Daubert sense. -"'
No court had yet defined what an appropriate rate of error for
fingerprint practitioners would be under Daubert. However, in past
fingerprint cases, courts had concluded that rates of error were
sufficiently minute, if they existed at all.2-1 As one court noted, the
error rate for latent prints is
certainly far lower than the error rate for other types of opinions
that courts routinely allow, such as opinions about the diagnosis of a
disease, the cause of an accident or disease, whether a fire was
accidental or deliberate in origin, or whether a particular industrial
facility was the likely source of a contaminant in groundwater.25s
252 Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
253. See id. at 512. When questioned by government counsel regarding the
practitioner rate of error, Meagher agreed that practitioner error existed, replying,
"[s]ure, we're human." Id.
254. Id.; Gail Gibson, Fingerprint Match Ruling Sinudges Evidentiary Rules, Bait.
Sun, Jan. 22,2002, at Al, 2002 WL 6948130.
255. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
256. Id. at 513. In addition to Meagher's study, the court noted the rate of error for
fingerprint examiner proficiency tests. In 1995 forty-four percent of examiners tested
could identify all of the fingerprints in the given test. Neufeld & Scheck, supra note
236. In 1998 this number grew to fifty-eight percent. Id.
257. United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854-55 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff'd,
260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001); see United States v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221, at 02 (E.D.
La. July 31, 2001) (citing the reasoning in Havvard). In Ha'vard, the court stated
there was not a "high known or potential error rate" for fingerprints, and added:
[t]he defense has presented no evidence of error rates, or even of any errors.
The government claims the error rate for the method is zero. The claim is
breathtaking, but it is qualified by the reasonable concession that an
individual examiner can of course make an error in a particular case.
117 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
258. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854-55.
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In addition, several courts have simply not evaluated proffered
fingerprint identification testimony by its rates of error because of the
perceived reliability of all fingerprint testimony.259 Courts have also
suggested that although a rate of practitioner error exists, it is
mitigated by independent evaluation of the evidence by two different
experts during the verification stage of ACE-V.2 6
While the court in Llera Plaza I accepted, arguendo, a low rate of
methodological error for fingerprint identification, it found the
practitioner rate of error too significant to ensure reliability under
Daubert.26'
d. Controlling Standards
The fourth Daubert factor analyzed by the court in Llera Plaza I
was the controlling standards used by fingerprint technicians. The
court divided its analysis in accordance with three subcategories:
"Galton point minima," "identifying fingerprints," and "examiner
qualifications."262  The court concluded that, because no uniform
standards exist for any of these criteria, fingerprinting technology
lacks controlling standards under Daubert.263  Examiners may
compare any number of Galton points264 in reaching their decision
about fingerprint identification because no minimum standards
exist.265 In addition, the decision that two fingerprints are identical is
itself a subjective determination." 6  Furthermore, fingerprint
examiners have no certification requirements and no standard
certification process. 267 In fact, many have no formal training other
than the training they receive on the job.26
259. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, No. 99-238, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6399
(E.D. La. May 14, 2001) (finding no Daubert hearing required because fingerprints
are reliable and scientific); United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D.D.C.
2000) (finding no Daubert hearing required because fingerprint identification
techniques are well-established).
260. United States v. Rogers, No. 01-4455, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27052, at *4 (4th
Cir. Dec. 20, 2001). But see supra note 240 and accompanying text.
261. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
262. Id. at 513-14.
263. Id. at 516.
264. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
265. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
266. Id. at 513-14.
267. Id. at 514.
268. See Coppock, supra note 34, at 92. As Coppock notes
[m]inimum educational and experience qualifications for the hiring of a
fingerprint specialist vary greatly .... The requirement may simply be a high
school diploma or GED, driver's license and 21 years of age.... [or a]
bachelor's degree, or a minimum amount of experience in a related field of
study. Most fingerprint training relies on state and FBI-sponsored
programs, as well as on-the-job experience.
Id. However, in Kumho Tire, the Court reasoned that even a perfume tester, for
example, could be deemed qualified by virtue of his experience testing perfumes.
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Judge Pollak began with a brief summary of his January 7, 2002
opinion in Llera Plaza L86 He then discussed his decision to grant the
government's motion for reconsideration of his exclusion of
fingerprint testimony. The court acknowledged that the typical
reasons for granting a motion for reconsideration- a change in law or
in material facts-were not factors in its decision." Instead, the court
agreed to reconsider its decision in Llera Plaza I because that decision
was based on the cold record in the Mitchell case.' Judge Pollak felt
that reconsideration was "prudent" because he had never seen or
heard witnesses testify when he ruled on January 7, 2002.3
On February 25-27, 2002, the court in Llera Plaza II heard "live"
testimony regarding the reliability of fingerprint identification
techniques. 290
a. Rate of Error
Stephen Meagher, an FBI agent who had testified in the Mitchell
case, testified for the government at the February 2002 hearing. He
explained that FBI fingerprint examiners must have a bachelor's
degree and must complete a two-year training program and a three-
day certifying examination.9 Meagher pointed out that, in addition
to meeting the FBI's hiring standards, FBI fingerprint examiners who
testify in court must be certified.2'
In order to gain certification, examiners must pass an annual
proficiency test administered by FBI personnel. - 3 The test requires
examiners to match a series of latent fingerprints with a series of
exemplar prints.29 Meagher testified that from 1995 to 2001 only
three identification errors were recorded.295 None of these errors
were "false positives" (the matching of two prints that are not
identical); instead, the recorded errors were the result of an
examiner's failure to match two prints that were in fact identical.- 6
Allan Bayle, a defense witness and former fingerprint examiner for
New Scotland Yard, asserted that the FBI's proficiency tests were too
easy because the prints used were much clearer than those found at a
typical crime scene.2' He also claimed that the FBI tests contained
286. Id. at *1-3.
287. Id. at *3-4.
288. Id. at *4
289. Id
290. Id.
291. Id. at *6 & n.2.
292- Id. at *6.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at *7.
296. Id
297. Id. at *8. Bayle testified that, while ACE-V was a reliable fingerprint
identification method, his inspectors would "fall about laughing" if given the
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more matching prints than were typical in a criminal investigation.29 8
Judge Pollak agreed that "the proficiency tests are less demanding
than they should be"; however, he found the tests a sufficient
indicator of a low rate of practitioner error for purposes of Daubert
because FBI examiners had scored "spectacularly well." 299
Judge Pollak also based his conclusion on the defense's inability to
assert evidence to contradict the low rate of practitioner error among
FBI fingerprint examiners.30 While several practitioner errors have
been recorded among state and local fingerprint examiners, the FBI's
rate of error was effectively zero.3 °1 While Judge Pollak's January 7,
2002, analysis of practitioner error in Liera Plaza I determined the
general error rate among fingerprint examiners to be high, by limiting
his analysis to FBI examiners, Judge Pollak found a lower rate of
error in his second evaluation of fingerprint evidence in Llera Plaza
II.
b. Controlling Standards
In Llera Plaza I, Judge Pollak determined that inadequate
controlling standards existed for fingerprint identification techniques
based on his analysis of three categories: (1) examiner qualifications;
(2) Galton points; and (3) fingerprint identifications °2 After hearing
Stephen Meagher's testimony about the minimum qualifications for
FBI fingerprint examiners in Liera Plaza H, Judge Pollak concluded
that the examiner qualification standards were sufficiently rigorous. 03
He then discussed the absence of a minimum standard for the number
of Galton points required in fingerprint identifications in the United
States.
In Llera Plaza II, Judge Pollak placed great emphasis on the recent
change in the United Kingdom's fingerprint identification
procedures.3 "4 While the United Kingdom formerly required the
proficiency tests used by the FBI. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at *13-14.
300. Id. at *14.
301. See id. at *7; supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing criminal
convictions based on erroneous fingerprint identification testimony).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 262-63.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 291-92.
304. In an effort to determine the current standards for fingerprint identification
testimony in the United Kingdom, Judge Pollak contacted Lord Lester of Herne Hill,
"a leading barrister and also a leading public law scholar [and] ... good friend ... for
some thirty years." Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 389163, at *17 n.9. Judge Pollak reasoned
that Lord Lester "seemed the logical person to ask about the current state of English
fingerprint jurisprudence." Id. As Judge Pollak further explained, "[wihat I certainly
did not anticipate was that Lord Lester would undertake to enlarge his (and, by
extension, my, and, by further extension, counsels') knowledge base by formally
addressing questions to Her Majesty's Government." Id. Judge Pollak concluded,
however, that "[tihis is a method of legal research to which I could cheerfully become
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evaluation stage that follows this part involves subjective opinion-
making. 37
After fingerprint examiners analyze and compare prints, they make
an evaluation that can take three different forms: (1) "absolutely
him"; (2) "absolutely not him"; and (3) "absolutely I don't know."'
Ashbaugh indicated that the evaluation stage is "based on your
knowledge and experience and your ability.""n9 The final stage of
ACE-V, verification, requires the submission of fingerprints to
independent peer-testing, where a different examiner repeats the
identification process from analysis to evaluation.2 0
Judge Pollak decided that fingerprints were not able to be "tested"
within the meaning of Daubert, because no objective criteria existed
by which to prove or disprove the conclusion of a given fingerprint
examiner.241 Instead, the decision that two fingerprints matched was,
as the experts admitted, a subjective conclusion. -' 2  This sort of
conclusion did not square with the court's notion of "scientific
evidence." As it pointed out, by quoting Dr. Stoney's testimony,
"there is not an objective standard that has been tested. 2 3
b. Peer Review
The second Daubert factor considered by the court in Lera Plaza I
was whether fingerprint identification evidence had been subject to
peer review.2' Much has been written about fingerprinting
techniques and classification over the last century. However, the
court concluded that because fingerprint examiners comprised a
technical community, rather than a scientific community, fingerprint
identification evidence had not been peer reviewed within the
meaning of Daubert.45 The court held that peer review necessitated
237. Lera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 498-99.
23& Id. at 500.
239. Id at 499.
240. Id. Some scholars feel the verification stage of ACE-V would operate more
effectively if the technician repeating the steps of analysis, comparison, and
evaluation is kept away from any information about the case that is not absolutely
essential to the fingerprint identification process. See D. Michael Risinger, Michael J.
Saks, William C. Thompson, & Robert Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications
of Observer Effects in Forensic Science. Hidden Problems of Erpectation and
Suggestion, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 45 (2002). This would prevent any suggestive prejudice
from interfering with the verification stage. See id.
241. See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
242. Id. at 507-08.
243. Id. at 508.
244. Id.
245. The court did not explain what it considered to be peer review in the -Daubert
sense" other than to quote from Daubert that "submission to the scrutiny of the
scientific community is a component of 'good science."' Id. (quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993)).
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"the scrutiny of the scientific community" rather than that of the
technical community of fingerprint examiners.246
However, in Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court had extended the
Daubert analysis to an evaluation of technical, or nonscientific, expert
testimony. While fingerprint examiners may not qualify as a relevant
"scientific" community, they comprise a "technical" community for
purposes of peer review and publication.247 Instead of interpreting the
"peer review and publication" factor as also applying to a relevant
"technical" community, the court maintained that this Daubert factor
applied exclusively to an evaluation of a "scientific" community.248
c. Rate of Error
One of the most complicated portions of the court's decision in
Llera Plaza I was its discussion of potential rates of error for
fingerprint identifications. Judge Pollak began with an examination of
the probable rate of methodological error in fingerprint
identification.249 While the government argued that the error rate was
"not a relevant inquiry,""0  and that methods of fingerprint
identification "[do not] have error at all,""1  Judge Pollak seemed
dubious. However, the court conceded that the rate of
246. Id. (emphasis added).
247. For examples of cases where district courts interpreted the Daubert standard
of peer review as encompassing the relevant technical community as well as the
relevant scientific community, see United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 555-60
(D. Md. 2002), Meineker v. Hoyts Cinema Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d 376, 380 (N.D.N.Y.
2001), Samuel v. Ford Motor Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 491,492 (D. Md. 2000).
248. As the court noted:
Given that Kumho Tire establishes that the Daubert analysis is applicable to
"technical" as well as "scientific" knowledge, it may be thought that this
court's characterization of the knowledge base of fingerprint examiners as
"technical" rather than "scientific" is a semantic distinction which is of no
practical consequence. However... the court finds that ACE-V does not
[satisfy Daubert's standards].
Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
249. "Methodological error" refers to any errors resulting from the fingerprint
identification techniques alone, without calculating the effect that human error could
have on the techniques.
250. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
251. Id. at 510. One scholar suggests the weight accorded to the rate of
methodological error in fingerprint identification and other technologies by courts
stems from the increased reliance on DNA evidence in the courtroom. See Mnookin,
supra note 75, at 54-56. Because DNA experts are able to calculate methodological
rates of error, courts have come to expect other experts to be able to do the same. Id.
However, judges will have difficulty piercing the seemingly impenetrable culture
among fingerprint examiners, who as one body rarely admit to making mistakes, to
discern the methodological rate of error. Id. As one website maintained by a latent
fingerprint examiner claims, "[tihe science of friction ridge identification leaves no
room for error when professional guidelines are followed in its application." Ed
German, Frequently Asked Questions About Fingerprints, Latent Print Examination,
at http://onin.com/fp/lpfaq.html#qlpo (last visited Feb. 18,2002).
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France, among other countries, requires examiners to compare a
minimum number of detail points, or Galton points, before making an
identification.269 While the FBI once had a minimum standard, it
abandoned it in the 1940s.270 Some fingerprint examiners argue that
minimum standards would impede the reliability of their
conclusions.271 It is more likely that minimum standards would limit
the number of identifications to which examiners could testify,
because the size of some latent prints is so small that examiners could
not locate the minimum number of identification points required.z
Regardless, this lack of uniformity poses a serious challenge to the
forensic community.
e. General Acceptance
The fifth and last factor discussed by the court in Llera Plaza I was
the Frye "general acceptance" standard.21 Based on the extensive
history of fingerprint evidence admitted under the general acceptance
standard in the courtroom, this standard would seem to be the easiest
for the government to substantiate. However, while the court in Llera
Plaza I admitted that ACE-V satisfies this criterion "in significant
fashion," it nonetheless ruled that "[g]eneral acceptance by the
fingerprint examiner community does not.., meet the standard set by
Rule 702. "274
As previously discussed, Judge Pollak premised his evaluation of
"general acceptance," as well as peer review and publication, on the
determination that fingerprint examiners are not scientists and that
fingerprint evaluation techniques are not scientific.- ' Thus, Judge
Pollak reasoned that fingerprint examiners' techniques will never be
"uniformly accepted" under Daubert 6  Instead, they will remain
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). While a perfume tester's
testimony in a civil case is a far cry from a fingerprint examiner's proffered testimony
in a capital murder case, the fact remains that no formal training is required to qualify
as an expert. However, in Kumho Tire the Court recognized that qualification was
only one of several standards to consider when determining whether controlling
standards exist. Id.
269. Mnookin, supra note 75, at 58.
270. Id. Although the FBI has no minimum standards, some cities and states may
employ minimums. See id. (adding that, despite any uniform standards among
jurisdictions, an expert need not compare any minimum number of points to testify at
trial about fingerprint identification).
271. See, eg., Latent Print Examination, at http.//onin.com/fpfhtmwwvboard/
messages/3.html (opinion of Senior Forensics Specialist in the Orange County, Cal.,
Sheriffs Department) (last visited Mar. 12,2002).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35 (describing the
quantitative/qualitative analysis employed by fingerprint examiners).
273. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,
2002), vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10,2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
274. Id. at 515.
275. See supra text accompanying note 247.
276. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
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accepted only among the "technical" fingerprint examiner
community.2
77
Some might argue that, under Kumho Tire, a technique could
satisfy Daubert by its "general acceptance" among the technical
community that uses it. After all, the policy behind the general
acceptance standard was that those who develop and use a particular
technique are best able to determine its reliability.278 However, Judge
Pollak ruled that even if fingerprint identification testimony satisfied
the general acceptance test, this factor alone was not enough to ensure
the reliability of the testimony for purposes of admission at trial.7
Thus, in Llera Plaza I, Judge Pollak redefined fingerprint
identification evidence as "technical" rather than "scientific"
evidence. Although he acknowledged that technical evidence is
admissible according to Daubert and Kumho Tire, he found that
ACE-V, the scientific technique used by fingerprint examiners to
identify prints, failed at least four of the five Daubert standards
analyzed.' The court stopped short of excluding all fingerprint
evidence.381 Instead, it excluded only that portion of the ACE-V
analysis that it thought required subjective evaluation on the part of
the examiner.2
2. Judge Pollak's March 13,2002, Decision To Reverse Himself and
To Admit All Proffered Fingerprint Identification Testimony in Llera
Plaza H
On March 13, 2002, in Llera Plaza II, Judge Pollak reversed his
previous decision to limit the testimony of the government's expert
fingerprint identification witnesses.2 Although the court reiterated
that fingerprint identification techniques fail to comprise a science, it
acknowledged that these techniques are rooted in science because of
the uniqueness and permanency of fingerprints.' In Llera Plaza H
the court ultimately held that, when viewed "through the [p]rism of
Kumho Tire,"' fingerprint identification techniques are reliable
enough to be admitted at trial.
277. Id. at 515-16.
278. Supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
279. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 515-16 ("The failure of fingerprint
identifications fully to satisfy the [other] ... Daubert factors militates against heavy
reliance on the general acceptance factor.").
280. Id. at 516.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 516-17.
283. United States v. Llera Plaza, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163, at *22 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).




comparison of sixteen Galton points in order to make an
identification, this standard was recently abandoned. -" The United
Kingdom now employs the same quantitative/qualitative analysis of
fingerprints used in the United States and Canada.' The court
concluded that "the minimum-Galton-point issue discussed in the
January 7 opinion is now moot," because England's abandonment of a
minimum standard led the court to believe "there is sufficient
uniformity within the principal common law jurisdictions to satisfy
Daubert."31
The perceived subjectivity of fingerprint identification techniques
had been critical to the court's decision to exclude testimony about
the evaluation stage of ACE-V in Llera Plaza I.' In Llera Plaza II,
however, Judge Pollak stated "[o]n further reflection, I disagree with
myself."3' Judge Pollak recognized that experts are often permitted
to testify to their subjective opinions at trial."u To support this
assertion, Judge Pollak cited cases involving engineering and market
research experts, where "the expert is operating within a vocational
framework that may have numerous objective components, but the
expert's ultimate opining is likely to depend in some measure on
experiential factors."3"
c. Testing
While Judge Pollak discussed the Daubert criterion of "testing" at
length in Llera Plaza I, 312 he spent only a few sentences on this topic
in Llera Plaza II. Despite the presentation of additional testimony
regarding the ability of fingerprints to be tested, Judge Pollak
remained unconvinced. He found that this criterion was still not met,
because neither "adversarial" testing nor the "verification" stage of
ACE-V constituted "testing" for purposes of Daubert11
d. Peer Review and General Acceptance
The court also gave short shrift to the topics of peer review and
general acceptance in Llera Plaza H. Judge Pollak concluded that,
while the peer review journals of fingerprint examiners are not
scientific journals, they satisfy Daubert because of "the utility of the
accustomed." Id.
305. Judge Pollak used the results of Lord Lester's questioning of Her Majesty's
Government in order to arrive at this knowledge. Id. at *17.
306. Id. at *17-18.
307. Id. at *18.
308. See supra text accompanying note 282.
309. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 389163, at *18.
310. See id.
311. Id.
312. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
313. Llera Plaza. 2002 WL 389163. at *12.
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identification procedures employed by fingerprint specialists, whether
on the witness stand or at a disaster site. 314
In addition, while Judge Pollak acknowledged in Llera Plaza I that
general acceptance was the Daubert factor that fingerprint
identification techniques satisfied "in significant fashion, 3 5 in Llera
Plaza 11, Judge Pollak further stated that
the fingerprint community's "general acceptance" of ACE-V should
not be discounted because fingerprint specialists-like accountants,
vocational experts, accident-reconstruction experts, appraisers of
land or of art, experts in tire failure analysis, or others-have
"technical, or other specialized knowledge" (Rule 702), rather than
"scientific ... knowledge" (id.), and hence are not members of what
Daubert termed a "scientific community.,
316
In Llera Plaza I the court also relied heavily on the treatment of
fingerprint identification techniques in the United Kingdom.3 7 Judge
Pollak wrote extensively about the English origin of fingerprint
identification techniques.318 He concluded that "[tjhe ACE-V regime
that is sufficiently reliable for an English court is ... a regime whose
reliability should.., be regarded by the federal courts of the United
States as satisfying the requirements of Rule 702 as the Supreme
Court has explicated that rule in Daubert and Kumho Tire. 319
In sum, after reanalyzing the five Daubert factors used in Llera
Plaza I, the court in Llera Plaza H concluded that fingerprint
identification testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at
trial. While the inability of ACE-V to be tested was a concern, it was
insufficient to warrant the exclusion of fingerprint identification
testimony.320
314. Id.
315. See supra text accompanying note 274.
316. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 389163, at *12. Despite the court's proper application
of Kumho Tire, it should be noted that the gravity of the role of "accountants,
vocational experts, accident-reconstruction experts, appraisers of land or art, [and]
experts in tire failure analysis" in civil cases differs significantly from the role of
fingerprint examiners in a death penalty case.
317. In total, the court read approximately two pages of testimony from Lord
Lester's questioning of Her Majesty's Government into the record.
318. Unlike his decision on January 7, 2002, Judge Pollak's March 13 decision
discussed the history of fingerprint identification techniques using lengthy excerpts
from Colin Beavan's 2001 book, Fingerprints: The Origins of Crime Detection and the
Murder that Launched Forensic Science. See Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 389163, at *5, 11 &
n.6, 20 & n.13. Judge Pollak also quoted extensively from a 1913 edition of
Encyclopedia Britannica. Id. at *21 n.14.
319. Id. at *21.
320. While Judge Pollak, quoting from a March 9, 2002 OpEd article in the New
York Times written by Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck, recognized that further
scientific testing of fingerprint identification techniques is needed, he was "not
persuaded that courts should defer admission of testimony with respect to
fingerprinting.., until academic investigators ... have made substantial headway. Id.
at *20. He concluded that to do so "would be to make the best the enemy of the
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III. THE NEED FOR CLARITY IN THE LAW GOVERNING FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
Confusing and inconsistent standards cloud the history of expert
scientific testimony. 21  In Daubert and Kumho Tire, the Supreme
Court made an effort to clarify these standards and provide increased
certainty to parties.3" The technology involved in fingerprint
identification is simple and straightforward. " -  An application of
Daubert standards to this technique should produce consistent results
regarding the admissibility of fingerprint evidence. Increased attacks
on fingerprint identification testimony, however, coupled with the
controversy surrounding the decisions in Lera Plaza I and II, indicate
that certainty may be a long way off.
In the two months between Judge Pollak's January 7 decision in
Llera Plaza I and his March 13 decision in Llera Plaza II, at least one
criminal defendant attempted to use Judge Pollak's reasoning to
exclude fingerprint identification testimony in federal court n4  The
attention paid to Llera Plaza I resulted, at least in part, from Judge
Pollak's stature as a jurist and a scholar,3 -' as well as from his
distinction as the first judge to exclude fingerprint identification
testimony. 26
good." Id.
321. See Saks, supra note 7, at 1128 ("[Forensic evidence admissibility] is riddled
with contradiction, confusion and chaos.").
322. See discussion supra Part II.A. However, while a uniform federal standard for
admission of expert testimony exists, states continue to follow a number of different
rules, including the Frye test. See supra note 21.
323. Unlike other types of forensic evidence, fingerprint comparison techniques
require no fancy accoutrements. While the analysis may be aided by computers, it is
not dependent on technology, as DNA evidence is.
324. United States v. Salim, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3843, at *19-25 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
11, 2002) (denying defendant's motion to preclude testimony of the government's
expert fingerprint identification witness). At least one other criminal defendant had
pledged to use the Lera Plaza I decision in an attempt to exclude fingerprint
evidence linking him to a murder. Michael Higgins, Defense to Use Fingerprint Ruling,
Chi. Trib., Mar. 1, 2002, at 7,2002 WL 2628862.
325. See supra note 191.
326. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text; See also Newman, supra note
197 (quoting David L. Grieve, editor of the Journal of Forensic Identification, as
forecasting in 1999 that "if the court determines that fingerprint analysis is not a
science, other types of forensic examination will surely follow").
More surprising than his ultimate conclusion in Llera Plaza I, was Judge
Pollak's unequivocal categorization of fingerprint examiners as "technical" rather
than "scientific." United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 515-16 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 7, 2002), vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
James E. Starrs, a professor of law and forensic science at George Washington
University, and witness for the defense in United States v. Mitchell, commented,
"what's so important is the judge has distinguished what is science from what is not."
Gibson, supra note 254. This view of fingerprint examiners is not without its
adherents. As one scholar wrote, "[a] vote for science is a vote to exclude fingerprint
expert opinions." Saks, supra note 7, at 1106. In his March 13 opinion, Judge Pollak
did not retreat from his categorization of fingerprint identification techniques as
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Other types of forensic evidence have recently received increased
scrutiny. At least one district court judge has excluded proffered
handwriting analysis evidence in its entirety, citing the failure of this
evidence to pass Daubert's minimum standards.3 7  Legal scholars
believe increased challenges to ballistics and other types of forensic
evidence will likely follow from these decisions.3 8 Thus, the need for
clarity in the treatment of scientific and technical evidence is a
pressing concern.
This part argues for increased clarity in the application of Daubert
to fingerprint evidence in criminal cases in light of the court's
decisions in Llera Plaza I and 11. Few courts have ever seriously
questioned the reliability of fingerprint identification testimony.2 9 In
Llera Plaza I, Judge Pollak applied the five Daubert reliability factors
in a much more thorough manner than most, if not all, judges before
him.33 Perhaps the court was more cautious than previous courts
because Llera Plaza is a capital murder case. Regardless, Judge
Pollak's exacting treatment of fingerprint evidence represents a step
in the right direction that should not be overshadowed by his
subsequent reversal of himself.
As Llera Plaza I and II show, the application of Daubert to
fingerprint identification testimony is difficult, even for a scholar of
nonscientific. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 389163, at *12.
327. United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001); see also
United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Neb. 2000) (limiting
handwriting evidence to objective comparison testimony); United States v. Van Wyk,
83 F. Supp. 2d 515 (D. N.J. 2000) (limiting handwriting expert testimony); United
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass 1999) (excluding handwriting evidence
involving an expert's opinion about the identification of a writer).
328. Newman, supra note 197. Ballistics is defined as "the study of a weapon's
firing characteristics, esp. as used in criminal cases to determine.., whether a
particular gun fired a given bullet." Black's Law Dictionary 138 (7th ed. 1999).
Experts fear ballistics will face increased evidentiary challenges because gun barrels
change over time, as shots are fired, and thus lack the permanency of fingerprints. See
Printing Errors, The Economist, Jan. 19,2002, at 66.
Other commentators expected Judge Pollak's decision to have little impact on
the overall treatment of scientific evidence in the courtroom, even before learning of
Judge Pollak's reversal of himself on March 13, 2002. See Newman, supra note 197
(citing Lawrence Brown, executive director of the California District Attorneys'
Association as opining that "a single ruling from a federal judge did not mean the
demise of fingerprinting"). Since Daubert was decided in 1993, as many as seventeen
challenges to fingerprint evidence have been successfully diverted in federal criminal
cases. See Latent Print Examination, Legal Challenges to Fingerprints, at
http://onin.comlfp/daubertjlinks.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). In addition to
federal district court proceedings, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have also refused
to exclude fingerprint evidence as unreliable. Id. (citing United States v. Rogers, No.
01-4455, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27052 (4th Cir. Dec. 20, 2001); United States v.
Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)).
329. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
330. See United States v. Cline, No. 00-40024, 2002 WL 436737, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb.
21, 2002) (characterizing the Llera Plaza I decision as "exhaustive and informed"); see
also infra note 344 and accompanying text.
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Judge Pollak's magnitude. Courts cannot continue to shirk their duty
to apply Daubert, however, simply because fingerprint identification
testimony has been accepted in the United States and the United
Kingdom for over one hundred years. The court's decision in Llera
Plaza I to limit expert fingerprint identification testimony represents a
helpful foundational analysis on which future courts may build when
analyzing the admissibility of such evidence. The court's decision,
however, had several gaps in its reasoning.
Because Llera Plaza I was contrary to all previous decisions on
fingerprints, Judge Pollak needed to ensure that no such gaps existed.
This part argues that the court in Llera Plaza I needed to explain
more thoroughly its rationale for excluding testimony that two prints
"match" so that other courts less familiar with scientific evidence, or
more apprehensive about excluding long-accepted forensic
techniques, might gain the confidence to apply Daubert in a similar
manner. By applying Daubert correctly, courts will provide
individuals with the certainty they deserve from the justice system.
In addition, this part argues that the January 7 Llera Plaza I
decision suggests an alternative way for courts to address reliability
concerns with expert fingerprint testimony. Judge Pollak's exclusion
of the final evaluation stage of fingerprint expert testimony in Llera
Plaza I highlighted an often under-emphasized part of Rule 7022r31
The Rule states that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness... may testify thereto."3n
In Llera Plaza I, Judge Pollak allowed experts to testify to the
uniqueness and permanency of prints. He also allowed testimony
about the most complicated aspects of fingerprint identification
technology-the analysis and comparison stages of ACE-V.?
Undoubtedly, this testimony will help the jury. The one part of expert
fingerprint testimony that Judge Pollak excluded, however, was the
one thing jurors are able to do on their own-evaluate whether two
fingerprints match.31 Thus, while some might find the court's
331. Few courts spend much time with this section of Rule 702, probably because
the entire standard has been interpreted by courts as only requiring general relevance
for admissibility. While that may be true, and while the standard for relevance is
rather low, this part of Rule 702 may highlight a new avenue for courts to proceed
down in their struggle with the reliability of fingerprint identification testimony.
332. Fed. R. Evid. 702.
333. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 516 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002),
vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10,2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,2002).
334. See supra text accompanying note 282. If a judge allowed an expert to point
out the Galton points on two fingerprints, including the distance between the points,
and explained the background of fingerprint analysis, the last step is simply to
"match" the prints. If any one point does not match on both prints, the result is
"absolutely not him." See supra text accompanying note 238. Allowing juries to make
these matches would increase the caution among parties proffering fingerprint
identification testimony. Thus, the evidence brought before the court could enjoy an
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reasoning incongruous with the result it reached, its conclusion
presents an original way to consider expert fingerprint testimony.
A. The Need for Clarity and Predictability in the Evaluation of Expert
Fingerprint Identification Testimony
A fundamental idea in American jurisprudence is that rules of law
promote stability.33 Individuals may rely on a particular law and gain
a measure of certainty in their lives as a result. While Daubert applies
in both civil and criminal contexts, the threat to individual certainty is
most substantial in the criminal context, where life and liberty are at
stake.336 Thus, courts in criminal cases must apply Daubert uniformly
to promote certainty.
Certainty, post-Daubert, is somewhat obviated by the judge's role as
gatekeeper. After all, judges now employ broad powers of discretion
in how they evaluate the reliability of expert scientific testimony. The
Supreme Court has emphasized that Daubert represents a flexible
standard and not a rigid mandate.337 While the gatekeeping function
of the court entails an increased license for judicial activism, 33 the
Supreme Court's ultimate goal was the admission of only reliable
expert testimony at trial so that juries would not be unduly influenced
by "junk" science, and justice would not be perverted by
"quackery. '39 Judge Pollak arguably fulfilled his role as a gatekeeper
against unreliable expert testimony in Llera Plaza L Moreover, his
decision in Llera Plaza II did not change the impact on the perception
of fingerprint identification testimony which was made by Llera Plaza
I.
At least one court has recognized the importance of a complete
analysis of fingerprint testimony under Daubert so as to serve as a
useful guide to other courts. In United States v. Havvard, the
defendant, a convicted felon, was charged with firearms possession. 0
increase in reliability.
335. This concept of jurisprudence is reflected in the works of political theorists,
such as H. L. A. Hart, who wrote, "all [legal] systems, in different ways, compromise
between two social needs: the need for certain rules... and the need to leave open,
for later settlement.., issues which can only be properly appreciated and settled
when they arise in a concrete case." H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 130 (2d ed.
1994).
336. See supra text accompanying note 11. Life is at stake in Llera Plaza, the first
death penalty trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania since the death penalty was
restored in the 1980s. Gibson, supra note 254. Perhaps Judge Pollak's careful
adherence to the standards set forth in Daubert in his first decision reflects his
appreciation for this reality.
337. Supra text accompanying notes 174, 184.
338. See Holley Davis Thames, Comment, Frye Gone, But Not Forgotten in the
Wake of Daubert: New Standards and Procedures for Admissibility of Scientific
Expert Opinion, 63 Miss. L.J. 473, 484-85 (1994).
339. Supra text accompanying note 117.
340. United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 849 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff'd, 260
[Vol. 702860
LA TENT JUSTICE
The defendant sought to exclude a latent fingerprint recovered on one
of the guns used in the crime.-" Like Judge Pollak in Llera Plaza I
and II, the court discussed the five factors mentioned in Daubert, but
concluded that fingerprint identification testimony was sufficiently
reliable. 342
The court issued an opinion "so that other courts might avoid
unnecessarily replicating the process of establishing these points as
they try to ensure they comply with the Supreme Court's directive to
ensure that all types of expert testimony are subject to screening for
reliability." 3 Had the court in Havvard conducted a detailed analysis
of fingerprint identification testimony, its decision might have served
as a better model for other courts to follow. The court's application of
Daubert to the proffered expert fingerprint identification testimony,
however, was exceedingly brief-less than two pages in length.W
All other federal courts, besides the court in Llera Plaza I, that
have entertained challenges to fingerprint identification testimony in
criminal cases have reached the same conclusion as the court in
Havvard. The Havvard decision has been attacked, however, for not
properly applying Daubert. As one scholar remarked, Havvard
represents "[a]n excellent, albeit deeply troubling, example of a court
straining scientific credulity for the sake of a venerable forensic
science."" Despite the fact that Judge Pollak vacated his January 7,
2002 decision in LIera Plaza I, perhaps this first decision will serve as
the touchstone of a movement away from the over-simplification of
the Daubert test apparent in Havvard. Havvard emphasizes the need
for other judges ruling against the tide of popular opinion to provide,
as the court in Llera Plaza I attempted, detailed explanations of their
exclusions of long-accepted expert testimony.
While Judge Pollak's reasoning in Llera Plaza I was detailed, in
order to exclude unreliable evidence while promoting the stability of
legal standards, Judge Pollak needed to go one step further so as to
F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 851-55.
343. Id. at 855.
344. Id at 853-55. The Seventh Circuit, reviewing the district court's decision de
novo, affirmed its admission of fingerprint identification testimony. United States v.
Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
345. David L. Faigman et al., Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence (Draft Chapter of Forthcoming Second Edition of Modem Forensic
Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony) (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study,
April 2001), WL SF78 ALI-ABA 33. In contrast to this criticism of the Havvard
decision, at least one court has recognized that the Llera Plaza I decision "should be
applauded to the extent that it encourages empirical testing of the process within
more traditional 'scientific' parameters, leads to additional submissions to the
relevant body of peer review literature, and possibly fosters the development of
uniform standards followed and accepted by all qualified fingerprint examiners."
United States v. Cline, No. 00-40024,2002 WL 436737, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 21, 2002).
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properly instruct future courts. As the Supreme Court previously
provided, the factors listed in Daubert are a nonexclusive list 4 6
Instead of applying only the five factors listed in Daubert to
fingerprint identification testimony 47 Judge Pollak would have
enhanced his analysis if he had applied some of the other factors of
reliability recognized by courts.
As the Amendment Committee for Federal Rule of Evidence 702
noted, "[c]ourts both before and after Daubert have found other
factors relevant in determining whether expert testimony is
sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact." 8 Factors
considered by other courts include whether the expert: (1) drew an
unfounded conclusion from a standard scientific principle; (2) ruled
out alternative explanations for his or her results; or (3) gave an
opinion using a "field of expertise" generally known to give reliable
results. 49 Although neither the government nor the defendant may
have specifically raised these factors in Llera Plaza I, an evaluation of
fingerprint identification testimony according to these standards
would provide a more complete picture of the reliability of this
evidence.
In both Llera Plaza I and 11 the court determined that fingerprint
evaluation testimony was unreliable when analyzed according to
factors of "scientific" reliability.3 0 Indeed, Judge Pollak categorized
fingerprint examiners and their techniques as "nonscientific." 351 This
determination seems fitting in light of the history of fingerprint
identification testimony in American courtrooms.35 2 Yet, because of
its categorization as "technical," fingerprint identification testimony
deserved to be evaluated using factors that did not focus solely on
"scientific" guarantees of reliability.
In Llera Plaza H, Judge Pollak recognized the flexibility of Daubert
when viewed through the "[p]rism of Kumho Tire. '353 While this
recognition remedied the defect in his Llera Plaza I analysis of peer
review and general acceptance, his second opinion represented an
unnecessary step backward in terms of the proper application of
Daubert to fingerprint identification techniques. Although Judge
Pollak abandoned his semantic distinction between scientific and
technical expert testimony, in its place he needlessly held that the
status of fingerprint identification testimony in the United Kingdom is
346. Supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
347. Supra text accompanying note 173.
348. Fed. R. Evid. 702 amendment committee note.
349. Supra note 187.
350. See supra text accompanying note 280.
351. Supra text accompanying note 275.
352. See supra Part I.C.




determinative of the way fingerprints should be treated in the United
States.
In Llera Plaza II, Judge Pollak discussed the history of fingerprint
identification testimony in the United Kingdom and the United
States.354 While such a discussion would have supplemented Judge
Pollak's reasoning in Llera Plaza I, in his second decision it
represented an effort to highlight the importance of the English
treatment of fingerprint identification testimony. In addition, Judge
Pollak solicited information about England's "fingerprint
jurisprudence" from his friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill. 55 The
uniformity of fingerprinting techniques among common law
jurisdictions, however, should not be a determinative factor of
reliability under Daubert. In addition, Judge Pollak failed to
recognize that, while England may also use the ACE-V technique for
fingerprint identification, English courts are not bound by Rule 702,
Daubert or Kumho Tire.
As one scholar, quoted by Judge Pollak in Llera Plaza I,
commented, "[i]t takes a lot for a judge to reverse himself."" Judge
Pollak himself acknowledged that "[m]otions for reconsideration are
not favorites of the law," because they undermine the finality of legal
decisions. 357 Perhaps Judge Pollak's ruling in Liera Plaza II was a
result of the barrage of media attention that followed his first
decision. Indeed, Judge Pollak's mention in Llera Plaza II of a recent
New York Times article discussing the Llera Plaza I decision shows
his awareness of the media scrutiny.3-" Judge Pollak may have also
been influenced by the possibility of a pre-trial appeal of Llera Plaza
I. Such an appeal, according to one commentator, would have
resulted in the dismissal of the jury pool that had been selected for the
Llera Plaza case over a six month period. 59
Regardless of any outside pressure he may have felt, Judge Pollak's
decision in Llera Plaza II harkens back to the Jennings era, when
courts admitted fingerprint identification testimony because it had
been "in such general and common use that the courts [could] not
refuse to take judicial cognizance of it."' The court in Jennings had
also cited English practices when reaching its conclusion.-" While
Judge Pollak briefly discussed the Daubert factors of reliability, he
354. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
356. Mike Weiss, Judge Rules Fingerprints Can Be Used In Courts After All, S.F.
Chron., Mar. 14, 2002, at A3, 2002 WL 4015353 (quoting University of California at
Davis law professor Edward Imwinkelried).
357. Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 389163, at *21.
35& Id. at *19.
359. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Judge To Allow Fingerprint Evidence, Phila. Inquirer,
Mar. 14,2002,2002 WL 14966264.
360. See supra text accompanying note 133.
361. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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seemed to base his holding, like Jennings, on the conformity of
American fingerprint identification techniques with those of England.
Although Judge Pollak stated that a complete exclusion of
fingerprints would be "unwarrantably heavy-handed," 362 the logical
result of his Llera Plaza I reasoning regarding the subjectivity of
fingerprint techniques would be the complete exclusion of all
fingerprint identification testimony. This is because the subjective
identification of fingerprints by experts occurs at every stage of
fingerprint analysis. When looking for "red flags," the expert is
making a subjective determination. 63 When comparing the overall
pattern of fingerprints in the comparison stage, the expert is making a
subjective determination.3 4  When evaluating whether two
fingerprints match, the examiner is making a no less subjective
determination.365
The logical result of the court's analysis in Llera Plaza II is also the
total exclusion of fingerprint identification testimony. As some
scholars have noted, "[a] judge who takes Daubert's commands
seriously would be hard pressed to write a coherent opinion justifying
a decision to admit [fingerprint identification testimony]. ' 36  Judge
Pollak held that fingerprints cannot be tested within the meaning of
Daubert.367  In addition, the court determined that, while no
controlling standards existed in the comparison stage of ACE-V, such
standards did not matter in light of the United Kingdom's adoption of
the quantitative/qualitative method of fingerprint comparison.3 s Such
a conclusion is not supported by the Supreme Court's rulings in
Daubert or Kumho Tire. Thus, fingerprint identification testimony
did not fully satisfy either controlling standards or testing, both
Daubert factors, even when viewing this evidence through the "prism"
of Kumho Tire. Had the court in Llera Plaza 11 properly considered
the reliability of fingerprint identification techniques, it would have
reached the same conclusion to exclude this evidence as it had in
Llera Plaza J369
362. United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492, 516 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002),
vacated, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,2002).
363. Supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
364. Supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
365. Supra text accompanying note 238.
366. 3 David L. Faigman et. al., Modem Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science
of Expert Testimony § 27-1.0, at 348-49 (2d ed. 2002).
367. See supra text accompanying note 313.
368. See supra text accompanying note 306.
369. In Llera Plaza II, the court's evaluation of Daubert's "rate of error" factor was
also questionable. While Judge Pollak stated that the proficiency tests administered
by the FBI were "less demanding than they should be," he concluded that the error
rate factor had been satisfied, because "the defense witnesses offered not a syllable to
suggest that certified FBI fingerprint examiners as a group, or any individual
examiners among them, have not achieved at least an acceptable level of
competence." United States v. Llera Plaza, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163, at *14
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Yet, while judges encounter difficulties when analyzing fingerprint
identification testimony according to federal standards for
admissibility, fingerprints themselves are recognized as valuable
scientific evidence. Fingerprints are regarded as "[t]he bedrock
forensic identifier of the 20th century.""37 In both Llera Plaza I and II,
the court's first stage of analysis for fingerprint identification purposes
was the recognition of the uniqueness and permanency of prints 7 1
Although science provides us with no absolutes"- judges and
scientists alike seem to accept without qualification these two basic
tenets of fingerprints that make them useful for identification
purposes.sr Judge Pollak also recognized the value of fingerprints as
evidence. Thus, while he seriously questioned the reliability of
fingerprint identification testimony, Judge Pollak refused to totally
exclude this evidence in either Llera Plaza decision.
The tension between the need to limit unreliable comparisons of
fingerprints with the desire to admit testimony regarding the special
capacities of fingerprints as evidence is clearly illustrated in Llera
Plaza I and 11. Future courts evaluating fingerprint identification
testimony must learn to balance competing considerations of
exclusion and admission in order to avoid unjust results.
B. Taking the "E" out of "A CE-V": Leaving theEvaluation of
Fingerprint Identification to the Jury
While the reasoning in Judge Pollak's Lera Plaza I decision may
fail to provide judges or adversaries with total clarity about the
Daubert standard for fingerprint identification testimony, his ultimate
conclusion is invaluable. Rule 702 "recognizes that an expert on the
stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other
principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them
to the facts."'374 Although based on different grounds, Judge Pollak's
conclusion that fingerprint examiners could testify to the first two
steps of fingerprint identification under the ACE-V process, analysis
and comparison, provides a better prescription for reliability than
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002). However, as Rob Epstein, a defense attorney in the
Mitchell case stated, "[i]t's not the burden of the defense to show that the error rate is
unacceptably low. It's the government's [burden] to show that the rate is acceptably
low." Newman, supra note 199; see Fed. R. Evid. 702 amendment committee note
(indicating that the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of satisfying Rule
702's admissibility criteria).
370. Neufeld & Scheck, supra note 236.
371. This is usually the first stage of a court's analysis when evaluating expert
fingerprint identification testimony post-Daubert. For example, see the decisions in
Llera Plaza, Mitchell, and Havvard.
372. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
374. Fed. R. Evid. 702 amendment committee note.
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excluding or admitting all fingerprint testimony in a wholesale
manner.
As the testimony of several expert witnesses revealed, and as the
history of fingerprint identification has shown, the ultimate
determination of whether two fingerprints are identical is not one that
involves advanced or special technology.37 No computer can make
this identification; moreover, no tool is used other than the human
mind.376 As one scholar noted
[t]here is no more certain test for determining when experts may be
used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman
would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible
degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having
a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute. 7
The evaluation stage of fingerprint identification clearly shows that,
once the proper identification points are located on each print, the
final determination is one that any lay individual is capable of
making.3 78 While special training or experience could perhaps help
the human mind make this ultimate determination more quickly, it is
unlikely to help the mind see a match more clearly than any other
person could.379
Granted, the ultimate evaluation of whether two fingerprints match
is certainly more persuasive if delivered by an expert fingerprint
examiner; however, this testimony ultimately "is adding nothing that
could not be supplied by attorneys in the way of argument. '' 3sO Thus,
Judge Pollak could have properly excluded the evaluation section of a
fingerprint examiner's expert testimony regardless of its perceived
reliability.
If expert fingerprint identification testimony is strictly limited to
that testimony which would truly assist the trier of fact, both
advocates and judges would be better off. Time-consuming Daubert
hearings could be limited in scope, as could the costly "battle of the
experts," '381 if fingerprint identification testimony was limited to the
375. See supra Part I.B.1.
376. See Ashbaugh, supra note 228, at 104-08 (discussing the mental process
involved in fingerprint comparisons).
377. Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting Ladd, Expert Testimony,
5 Vand. L. Rev. 414,418 (1952)).
378. See supra text accompanying note 238.
379. Various training programs for fingerprint examiners exist, including several
offered by the FBI. See, e.g., Latent Fingerprint Examination, Upcoming Training
Courses, at http:lwww.onin.comlfp/wwwbd/messages/3/3.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2002). While these programs teach techniques such as location of Galton points and
how to detect "red flags," they provide no specific training to increase powers of
observation.
380. Steven A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of
Evidence Manual § 702.02[2], at 702-8 (2002).
381. Jayesh Shah, Limiting Expert Testimony About Sexual Harassment Policies,
1999 U. Chi. Legal F. 587, 622 ("[T]he 'battle of the experts' phenomenon degrades
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analysis and comparison stages and the evaluation stage is left to the
jury. In federal criminal trials, these benefits would follow from the
resulting need of prosecutors to use more caution in seeking to
introduce expert fingerprint identification.
Increased challenges to scientific evidence such as fingerprint
evidence demonstrate that major changes are ahead.'" If the
reasoning from Judge Pollak's opinions in Llera Plaza is used by other
courts, the possibility of total exclusion of expert fingerprint testimony
remains. In addition, Llera Plaza II narrowly addressed the reliability
of FBI fingerprint examiners." Thus, in cases involving state and
local expert witnesses, advocates may use the reasoning of either
Liera Plaza I or II in arguing against the admission of fingerprint
identification testimony.
Prosecutors who attempt to identify perpetrators by the testimony
of fingerprint examiners using poor quality latent prints risk having all
fingerprint evidence excluded in the future. In both Llera Plaza
decisions, Judge Pollak retained, during the course of the trial, the
gatekeeping power to exclude testimony about individual fingerprints
whose quality was deemed, in his opinion, too poor for the proper
application of ACE-V. For the forensic community to stem the tide of
challenges and regain a measure of certainty in its use of scientific
evidence in the courtroom, courts should at least allow jury
evaluations of evidence such as fingerprint evidence. Overall, this
option presents a better outcome than the looming alternative-total
exclusion.
CONCLUSION
While fingerprints may be objectively unique and permanent,
subjectivity is introduced when experts testify about the identification
of fingerprints. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
fingerprint identification testimony has been routinely accepted as
reliable; however, change is afoot. On January 7, 2002, the court in
United States v. Llera Plaza considered this evidence unreliable
because of the nonscientific nature of fingerprint identification
techniques, and the subjective qualities of fingerprint identification
itself.
Judges who apply Daubert to exclude long-accepted scientific
techniques like fingerprint identification need to carefully explain
their reasoning. Not only will this ensure the proper application of
Daubert, but it will also aid in the establishment of reliable decisions
to guide other courts in the future. In this respect, the vagueness in
juror perceptions of the validity of the expert opinion.").
382. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
383. United States v. Llera Plaza, Cr. No. 98-362-10, 2002 WL 389163 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 13,2002).
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certain areas of the reasoning in both Llera Plaza I and II is cause for
concern as to how subsequent courts will interpret these decisions in
their own analyses of fingerprint evidence. Nevertheless, Judge
Pollak's decision to limit fingerprint testimony in Llera Plaza I leaves
open the appealing possibility that triers of fact can be trusted to
evaluate fingerprints and decide if they are identical.
